



# This is Nonsense: My Precursory Excursion into Tractarian Mysticism

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## Introduction

When we speak, we assume that intelligibility is easily attainable. There seems to exist a peculiar false dichotomy in regard to the distinction between fact and belief. However, upon closer examination, such a distinction has no clear line of demarcation. My goal with this project is to use the *Tractarian* framework in attempts to show how no point of view has such authority. What I want to accomplish, ultimately, is far reaching. However, for this paper, my focus will be toward proposing a manner in which the will functions, in conjunction with systems of belief, to structure "the limits" of "what is the case" (Wittgenstein).

## Logical Space


Imagine a hollow sphere. This sphere has a core running through the middle of it. The core occupies a space, and the empty space around the core, within the sphere, represents a space separate from the space occupied by the core. The core represents all pictures, as is presented in the Tractarian notion of "picture theory". The space around the core represents all possible combinatorial states of affairs, or the Tractarian notion of "truth function theory". The individual occupies a given point, or multiple points in the space around the core. The total points occupied by the individual represents the "all that is the case" for the individual. The individual is positioned in logical space by his or her belief. The individual's belief functions in conjunction with the individual's will. Belief carries with it ontological implications, which are the positions in space in relation to the core (picture(s)).

## Questions

- What are the limits of what we can think?
- What is a fact?
- Is science more credible than religion?
- What is the "sense of the world"?
- What is the "will" and how does it work?

## The Self

For Wittgenstein, the absence of the self from "what is the case", in the same way that "an eye is not the object of its sight", is critical to understanding the nature of thought. Thus, to say "'A believes that p', 'A thinks p', 'A says p', are the form of 'p says p'" (Wittgenstein, 1999: 5.542). With this form, the subject disappears, or, is subsumed into all that is the case, which leads Wittgenstein to conclude that "there is no such thing as the soul--the subject, etc.--as it is conceived in contemporary superficial psychology" (Wittgenstein, 1999: 5.641).



## Tractatus

- The world is the totality of facts, not things
- We picture facts to ourselves
- It is impossible to tell from the picture alone whether it is true or false
- A logical picture of the facts is the thought
- The totality of true thoughts is a picture of the world
- The thought is the significant proposition
- Most of the propositions and questions to be found in philosophical works are not false but nonsensical
- Philosophy aims at the logical clarification of thoughts. Philosophy is not a doctrine, but an activity
- The limits of my language mean the limits of my world
- We cannot think what we cannot think; so what we cannot think, we cannot say either
- If good or bad willing changes the world, it can only change the limits of the world, not the facts; not the things that can be expressed in language
- The sense of the world must lie outside the world
- For an answer which cannot be expressed, the question too cannot be expressed. The riddle does not exist. If a question can be framed at all, it is also possible to answer it

## The Will

For my new conception of logical space, the will plays a crucial role, retaining similarities to its Tractarian counterpart. The will is still taken as a functional aspect which positions one in logical space. This begins with an understanding that "the sense of the world must lie outside the world" (Wittgenstein 1999: 6.41). What is the locus of a value which might give the world "sense"? Is it the self? God? Both of these lie outside the world and therefore, initially, seem to be valid options. Do we "will" value into the world? I propose that the will plays a vital role in the way we obtain value. For the *Tractatus*, there is no sensible starting point prior to the thought. However, it would seem that thought has bearing on other thought. So the question becomes, what is the role of the will in the manner which thought bears on other thought? This is of particular interest in the case of religious belief, due to the way in which we apportion will, in varying degree, between the self and the system.

## References and Acknowledgements

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