

LEADING AND LEARNING: UNDERSTANDING AND REDUCING INTELLIGENCE
LEADERSHIP FAILURES

A Thesis

Presented to the

Faculty of the College of Graduate Studies of

Angelo State University

In Partial Fulfillment of the

Requirements for the Degree

MASTER OF SECURITY STUDIES

by

DESIRAE ELYSE MALDONADO

May 2015

Major: Intelligence, Security Studies and Analysis

LEADING AND LEARNING: UNDERSTANDING AND REDUCING INTELLIGENCE
LEADERSHIP FAILURES

by

DESIRAE ELYSE MALDONADO

APPROVED:

Dr. Robert Sayre Ehlers Jr.

Dr. Jeffrey D. Dailey

Dr. Eduardo V. Martinez

Dr. Heather Jo Braden

May 2015

APPROVED:

Dr. Susan E. Keith
Dean of the College of Graduate Studies

DEDICATION

I would like to thank my family who has been there to support and push me through this journey. Without their love and support, I would not have been able to successfully complete this study. I would also like to thank my professors. Their passion for this field of study and strong dedication to their students has helped and allowed me to excel in not only this research study, but in the Security Studies Master's Program in its entirety. The constant support of these individuals has eased my journey through this program and research study, which that I am grateful for.

ABSTRACT

This research study is an analysis of leadership qualities and traits that are required in our Intelligence Community (IC) leaders in order to reduce intelligence failures. This work has involved gathering and studying extensive literature review, to include intelligence-agency unclassified historical documents and published material written by government officials to support the argument that intelligence failures can be reduced by emphasizing the use of education, training, and experience within an intelligence leader. A comparative analysis was used to illustrate the importance of these key elements through the use of historical case studies – the 2012 Benghazi attacks, Pearl Harbor and the Cuban Missile Crisis. Analysis of these case studies led us to conclude the importance and necessity of ensuring our intelligence leaders receive and seek the proper education, training and experience in order to maximize our efforts toward maintaining our national security.

TABLE OF CONTENTS

DEDICATION	iii
ABSTRACT	iv
TABLE OF CONTENTS	v
CHAPTER	
I. INTRODUCTION	1
II. KEY INTELLIGENCE-LEADER TRAITS	13
Leadership	13
Education	25
Training	29
Experience	37
III. CASE STUDIES	40
2012 Benghazi Attack	40
Pearl Harbor.....	48
Cuban Missile Crisis.....	57
IV. CONCLUSION	67
BIBLIOGRAPHY	71
APPENDIX A: ACRONYMS.....	79
VITA.....	80

CHAPTER I

INTRODUCTION

Our national security is protected and maintained through the combined efforts of Federal, state, and local government agencies. The Intelligence Community (IC), which is comprised of 17 Federal Government agencies, to include the Office of the Director of National Intelligence (ODNI), forms intelligence reports from collected data and delivers finalized intelligence products to policymakers who ultimately make decisions pertaining to the security of our nation. It is our intelligence leaders' responsibility to ensure the intelligence provided to policymakers is as accurate and reliable as possible. They are accountable for these reports and the impact they may have on our national security. Failure to ensure accuracy in the final reports can result in an intelligence failure, or a combined policy-intelligence failure, and ultimately have a negative impact on our nation's security.

Intelligence produced by the IC is intended to comprise the basis of decisions made by policymakers. Once they receive intelligence, policymakers have the freedom to use, discard, or cherry-pick it. The intelligence process used by the IC to produce final intelligence reports is directed by policymakers. This initial process is referred to as the "planning and direction" step.¹ The IC continues the intelligence process by collecting data, processing and exploiting the data, analyzing and producing intelligence, and, lastly, disseminating it to policymakers.² Ideally, policymakers give the IC initial and, in most

¹ Lowenthal, Mark M., *Intelligence from Secrets to Policy*. Washington, DC: CQ Press, 2009. Pg. 65

cases, general direction regarding what data to collect – and they do so before or in the very early stages of a national-security issue. It would be impossible for the agencies comprising the IC to collect every single piece of data pertaining to a subject within a reasonable time frame due to the abundance of information, so they must rely on their collection-management skills to collect the right information, choose actionable data based on relevancy and accuracy, produce analyses useful to policymakers, and ensure their timely delivery.

Without proper direction from policymakers, the IC would not collect the data necessary to analyze threats imposed upon our nation. If the intelligence process lacks initial direction, the chances of producing inaccurate intelligence reports are greater. Once the IC completes the intelligence process, the intelligence reports are then delivered to policymakers. They review the reports (ideally but not always in practice), and use them (again, not always) to help arrive at final decisions regarding policy issues. Decisions that lead to a mishap or unfavorable outcome will usually be blamed on the IC for providing policymakers with inaccurate or faulty intelligence, even if the intelligence produced was misinterpreted or cherry-picked by policymakers. As stated by Mark M. Lowenthal in *Intelligence: From Secrets to Policy*, “There are only policy successes and intelligence failures. There are no policy failures and intelligence successes.”³

Although our nation’s IC is, in general, highly respected and capable, there have been deficiencies as a result of inaccurate or faulty intelligence. Unfortunately, since failure is recognized much more often than success (successes are, by definition, almost always quiet), intelligence failures are more evident than a successful mission informed by accurate and

² Ibid.

³ Ibid. Pg. 184

reliable intelligence. It is clear that government systems are not perfect and will not always achieve success in every mission and task presented, but it is important that our intelligence leaders take appropriate measures to maximize their efforts in achieving excellence and success in their own right and in terms of convincing policymakers to make the best use of available intelligence. When considering the human factor, some degree of failure is inevitable, but our leaders can take the necessary steps to minimize both intelligence and policy failures. Since intelligence is often the foundation and basis of the final decisions made by policymakers, working to reduce these failures begins with our intelligence leaders. They are responsible for delivering intelligence to policymakers, and their diligence will generally determine whether it is relevant or faulty and, even more fundamentally, used or ignored. In order to deliver the best analysis of existing threats to policymakers in an attempt to maintain our national security, it is vital that intelligence leaders perform at their best and work continuously to improve their leadership and technical skills.

Circumstances are constantly changing around the world, so it is important that our IC and its leaders are able effectively to adapt to such changes. This calls for a delicate balance between promoting depth of analysis regarding major national-security threats, and agility to keep the IC ahead and emerging threats. Among all of the senior intelligence officer's jobs, this is perhaps the most important because without this proper balance, the best intelligence will not make it to our policymakers. Intelligence leaders must ensure they are taking all the steps necessary to fulfill their duties effectively and efficiently.⁴ Not only do senior intelligence professionals have to utilize their skills to combat complex threats, they

⁴ Definitions: effective - the level of the end result; efficiency – the minimal amount of time used while performing in the best possible manner.

must also use them to keep pace with continuous technological advances. Without the proper education, training, and experience among the leadership as well as the rank and file, the task of ensuring the relevancy and accuracy of intelligence becomes difficult to accomplish.

Despite our many successes, our government and its officials, including our IC and its leaders, must continuously strive for improvement in order to maintain our national security. This can be achieved by inculcating three key things - education, training, and experience.

The purpose of this study is to identify faults in our leadership system within the intelligence profession and determine how the IC can work toward improving key leadership skills and qualities to increase chances of analytical and policy success. In order to address this concern, we must first define what an intelligence leader is and the role these individuals play in the IC. By defining and examining intelligence leaders' roles within the IC and policy efforts, we are able to analyze their significance to our national security.

Although the qualities and traits emphasized in this study are central to improving leadership skills in any profession, leaders are not constrained to follow one specific leadership style or theory. There are several leadership styles and theories that leaders can follow to be efficient and effective. Peter G. Northouse recognizes several leadership practices and theories that have proven valuable in developing effective leaders. Some of the specific practices and theories Northouse addresses that are applicable to intelligence leaders include the style approach, situational approach, and transformational leadership approach.⁵ Competent leaders may combine many of these different practices and theories to help

⁵ Northouse, Peter G., *Leadership: Theory and Practice*. Thousand Oaks, CA: Sage Publications, 2004.

maximize their leadership potential. All of them rely to a significant degree on how a leader values and uses education, training, and experience.

The first leadership approach that some leaders practice is the style approach. According to Northouse, this approach “emphasizes the behavior of the leader.”⁶ Leaders are individuals who lead by example. The style approach focuses on leaders’ actions rather than what they are capable of or their personal characteristics.⁷ Subordinates are able to determine the quality of a leader through his or her actions. A leader’s behaviors are analyzed and broken down into two kinds of behavior: task and relationship. Task behavior helps subordinates accomplish tasks and missions, whereas relationship behavior focuses on the relationships built between the leader and his or her subordinates.⁸ Leaders are able to alter and shift their behaviors based on their subordinates’ responses. These behaviors are important because intelligence leaders are responsible for accomplishing the task of producing valid and relevant products and must build their relationships with other agencies to do so. A high level of balance between these two behaviors results in effective leadership. Without a high balance, intelligence leaders will be less likely to produce successful results.

One of the most common leadership styles is the situational approach. This style, as implied by its name, concentrates on the situations leaders are placed in and how they handle them.⁹ Each situation is different and requires leaders to approach them individually. Leaders are required to adapt their skills to each situation in order to be effective and

⁶ Ibid., pg. 65

⁷ Ibid.

⁸ Ibid.

⁹ Ibid., Pg. 87

properly handle the situation. This includes analyzing their subordinates and learning their strengths and weaknesses so they are able to adapt their leadership style to match the level of competence, energy, and expertise of their various subordinates.¹⁰ A leader must address and examine every factor of a situation to include the situation itself and its complexity and the individuals assigned to attack it or accomplish the task presented. Intelligence leaders adopt this style of leadership frequently due to the diversity of issues and tasks with which they are presented. Depending on the factors of surrounding the issue at hand, leaders may choose to work with certain agencies due to possible time constraints and access to particular information. In order to be successful in executing this style of leadership, they must exercise flexibility and properly adapt to each situation.¹¹

A leadership style widely used today is the transformational approach. This leadership style focuses on transforming leaders' subordinates positively and aiming to develop them into leaders themselves.¹² Transformational leadership involves an increase in motivation and morality in both the leader and the subordinate.¹³ Leaders become influential figures and encourage their subordinates to reach their full potential. Unlike the situational approach, which is by definition situation-specific, this type of approach is very broad. Its main focus is to improve subordinates as individuals while working together to accomplish the task presented. This style of leadership is vital within the IC. The IC's agencies are ideally supposed to work together to produce the most accurate intelligence possible.

¹⁰ Ibid., Pg. 91

¹¹ Ibid., Pg. 92

¹² Ibid., Pg. 169

¹³ Ibid., Pg. 170

Transformational leadership will increase coordination and information-sharing among the agencies, and encourage a joint effort regarding intelligence tasks, by giving subordinate analysts the leadership authorities and opportunities they need to develop this crucial set of skills.

Intelligence leaders who practice these different leadership approaches can become more effective through the proper use of education, training, and experience. This study will demonstrate the need for education and present different sources of education, such as academic institutes, which will enhance the analytical skills of our intelligence leaders. This work will also use the same approach to emphasize the significance of adequate training for leaders in the intelligence profession. Training is a tool that should be utilized throughout a leader's professional career. This study will highlight various training programs and courses available to intelligence leaders and demonstrate its underlying correlation with education. The last key element, experience, is a combination of life and professional events and a direct reflection of a leader's ability to apply the sources of education and training that he or she has received to real-world intelligence and policy problems.

The next step in this study is to relate the importance of these key elements through the use of historical case studies. These include Pearl Harbor, the Cuban Missile Crisis, and the 2012 Benghazi attacks. These analyses will allow the researcher to emphasize positive and negative leadership traits, and to examine the ways in which to enhance positive traits and limit negative ones – and by extension negative policy outcomes - through education, training, and experience. Intelligence leaders hold important positions that affect our national security, so it is vital that they utilize all resources to their maximum potential to help ensure that security.

This work incorporates qualitative methods, specifically comparative methods, to support its key arguments. These will identify differences among intelligence leaders and the ways in which they either succeeded or failed. An analysis of Pearl Harbor and the 2012 Benghazi attacks will provide examples of intelligence failures and allow us to identify the leadership traits contributing to it. From there, it will be possible to identify and emphasize the leadership actions that could have helped to prevent such failures.

One of the most well-known intelligence failures occurred on December 7, 1941. Japanese carriers launched a surprise attack against the U.S. Pacific Fleet at Pearl Harbor in Hawaii and destroyed four battleships and 188 U.S. aircraft. More than 2,400 Americans were killed and an additional 1,200 were injured.¹⁴ Our nation failed to prepare for such an attack from Japan as our IC and administration underestimated their capabilities and intent. As a result of failed intelligence, this surprise attack left our retaliatory powers crippled for nearly six months. The IC (in this case its forerunners in the Navy and War Departments) is responsible for collecting intelligence that pertains to an adversary's intentions and capabilities. Failure properly to collect, analyze, and distribute intelligence concerning Japan and their objectives led to one of our nation's most disastrous historical events that ultimately encouraged our nation to improve and unify intelligence efforts through better forms of organization and leadership within the IC. Unfortunately, we have experienced additional intelligence failures since then that have exposed weak IC and political leaders, including the 2012 Benghazi attacks.

¹⁴ "Pearl Harbor," *History Channel*, accessed February 28, 2015, retrieved from <http://www.history.com/topics/world-war-ii/pearl-harbor>

On September 11, 2012, Islamic militants attacked the U.S. Mission in Benghazi, Libya and killed 4 Americans to include Ambassador Christopher Stevens, Foreign Service Information Management Officer Sean Smith, and two former Navy SEALs, Glen Doherty and Tyrone Woods.¹⁵ U.S. personnel in Benghazi requested heightened security from the Obama Administration on multiple occasions prior to the attack in response to the acts of terrorism around them and continuous threats against them. The Obama Administration denied and/or ignored such security requests, as they did not view the requests as a high priority, and Islamic militants were able to ambush the U.S. Mission.¹⁶ After several warnings of terroristic activity from Ambassador Stevens and other U.S. Personnel at the U.S. Mission to the Obama Administration, the administration, along with the IC, failed to take appropriate security measures to ensure their safety. Although there is evidence that the IC did provide sufficient reports concerning the security issues and terroristic activity prior to the attack, intelligence leaders failed to follow through with their findings and assist the administration in increasing security measures for the U.S. Mission in Benghazi.¹⁷ They failed to fully understand the enemies' capabilities and their intentions, which ultimately led to the death of four Americans.

¹⁵ "Benghazi: The Terrorist Attack of September 11, 2012 – Executive Summary," *Discoverthenetworks.org – A Guide to the Political Left*, accessed January 24, 2015, retrieved from <http://www.discoverthenetworks.org/viewSubCategory.asp?id=1755>

¹⁶ U.S. Senate Select Committee on Intelligence, *Review of the Terrorist Attacks on U.S. Facilities in Benghazi, Libya, September 11-12, 2012 together with Additional Views*, (U.S. Senate Select Committee on Intelligence 113th Congress, January 15, 2014), pg. 17-19, <http://www.intelligence.senate.gov/benghazi2014/benghazi.pdf>

¹⁷ *Ibid.*, pg. 13-14, <http://www.intelligence.senate.gov/benghazi2014/benghazi.pdf>

Despite failures such as Pearl Harbor and Benghazi, there have been many more intelligence-policy successes. An in-depth analysis of the Cuban Missile Crisis will allow us to highlight the decisions made toward its successful mission and the respective leaders involved. On October 14, 1962, nuclear missiles were spotted on the island of Cuba by an American U-2 spy plane.¹⁸ President Kennedy and his principal advisors were informed of the shocking evidence during the morning of October 16, 1962, and deliberated over the matter to consider what actions needed to be taken. The President and his advisors knew that any action chosen could possibly lead to a bigger crisis. Eight days after the discovery of the nuclear missiles construction by the Soviet Union in Cuba, President Kennedy made the decision to address American citizens and inform them of the situation along with the possible outcomes that may result after action has been taken.¹⁹ President Kennedy addressed the public with caution by using verbiage, such as “quarantine,” to avoid triggering a war with the Soviet Union.²⁰ As stated in the Central Intelligence Agency (CIA) Library, “Even if events stopped a long way short of the cataclysm, there was still room for a thundering crisis, the outcome of which would depend in significant measure upon the way

¹⁸ “*The Cuban Missile Crisis of 1962: Presenting the Photographic Evidence Abroad.*” Central Intelligence Agency. July 7, 2008. <https://www.cia.gov/library/center-for-the-study-of-intelligence/csi-publications/books-and-monographs/sherman-kent-and-the-board-of-national-estimates-collected-essays/10cuban.html>

¹⁹ Sherwin, Martin J. “*One Step from Nuclear War – The Cuban Missile Crisis at 50: In Search of Historical Perspective.*” National Archives. Vol. 44, No. 2. Fall 2012. <http://www.archives.gov/publications/prologue/2012/fall/cuban-missiles.html>

²⁰ Ibid., <http://www.archives.gov/publications/prologue/2012/fall/cuban-missiles.html>

in which our allies would respond —whether they would support us or back away.”²¹ A nuclear war was at risk, but the President needed to terminate and remove the Soviet Union’s construction all while attempting to avoid such a war. The decision was made to quarantine Cuba from the importation of all offensive military equipment. Kennedy’s decision to force Secretary General Nikita Khrushchev to remove the missiles would upset the leadership of the Soviet Union, but his plan of action was to successfully remove the missiles without generating a war.²² This case study will enable the researcher to demonstrate the importance of the key elements that highly, competent leaders, such as President Kennedy and his advisors, should possess.

This work relies on source documents located as the result of an extensive literature review, including intelligence-agency unclassified historical documents and published material written by government officials to support the argument that intelligence failures can be reduced by inculcating and developing the key leadership elements addressed in this study. Using these sources will also help us to identify key leadership traits essential to becoming a successful leader. As with most intelligence-related subject matter, this study will face some limitations regarding source material. Although the work will highlight several sources of training and education that combine with operational experience, there are documents within the IC that are considered classified material and place certain limits on the

²¹ Ibid., <https://www.cia.gov/library/center-for-the-study-of-intelligence/csi-publications/books-and-monographs/sherman-kent-and-the-board-of-national-estimates-collected-essays/10cuban.html>

²² Ibid., <http://www.archives.gov/publications/prologue/2012/fall/cuban-missiles.html>

level of detail and fidelity the work can achieve. The IC has a responsibility in its handling of classified documents, “to maintain the secrecy of information, needs, and methods.”²³

By focusing on these key elements – education, training, and experience – in this work’s concluding chapter, we will be able to assess the characteristics that influence the effectiveness and efficiency of intelligence leaders. Furthermore, this study will demonstrate that without a strong leadership foundation optimized by these key elements, intelligence leaders are more likely to produce intelligence failures, which can potentially compromise our national security.

²³ Lowenthal, Mark M., *Intelligence from Secrets to Policy*. Washington, DC: CQ Press, 2009. Pg. 2

CHAPTER II

KEY INTELLIGENCE-LEADER TRAITS

Leadership

Becoming a successful leader requires a substantial amount of effort and dedication to the position and its defined role. In order to achieve success, leaders must explore the proper avenues, such as education and training, to build their experience and develop the key leadership traits. In 2004, the Intelligence Reform and Terrorism Prevention Act (IRTPA) was ratified, creating the director of national intelligence (DNI) who replaced the director of central intelligence (DCI) as the head of the IC.²⁴ The DNI serves as senior intelligence official and as principal intelligence adviser to the president, the National Security Council (NSC), and the Homeland Security Council (HSC).²⁵ This new position oversees all intelligence agencies, has access to all intelligence produced, and “is responsible for ensuring that it is disseminated as needed across the intelligence community.”²⁶ Senior intelligence professionals, such as the DNI require a certain set of skills that enables them to lead effectively and efficiently. Two of the most vital are the ability effectively and promptly to make decisions and to exercise appropriate ethical and moral standards in the process.

These skills are particularly important for intelligence leaders, but are also expected from all of those involved in the intelligence process. Nonetheless, senior leaders are ultimately accountable for their subordinates and the end result of an assigned task or

²⁴ Ibid., pg. 29

²⁵ Ibid.

²⁶ Ibid.

mission. Leaders who continuously practice these skills and work to develop them will increase the chances of more favorable intelligence and policy outcomes. At the most basic level, the intelligence process consists of several individuals working together to create a final intelligence report and ensure it reaches the consumer. As previously stated, the process begins with planning and direction from policymakers, leads to the collection of data by the IC, processing and exploitation, then analysis and production of that data, and ends with dissemination to policymakers.²⁷ Assessment of the effectiveness of intelligence assessments within a larger operational process is an equally important part of what is in effect an iterative and dynamic process occurring within a nonlinear and often ethically challenging situation. The decisions made in this process are based on a critical analysis of the potential results and consequences to each respective decision. Without critical thinking and the ethical-legal considerations that must accompany it, the final decisions can ultimately have a negative effect on our nation's security, particularly when politics, rather than policy considerations, impact the process, as they often do. Intelligence leaders must be particularly attuned and resistant to any kind of politicization.

It is essential intelligence leaders and policymakers maintain a strong relationship in order for the IC to produce the most accurate and relevant intelligence reports. Intelligence leaders have to ensure the policymakers' needs and requirements are met or they are in danger of wasting valuable time and imposing a bigger risk upon our national security. The IC is responsible for understanding their customers' needs and what they are working to accomplish. As Thomas Fingers states, "...the information provided by the Intelligence Community should be immediately helpful to policymakers because it is tailored to meet

²⁷ Ibid., pg. 65

their needs by people who have an insider's understanding of what those needs are."²⁸ The information collected by the IC is not determined valuable by its quantity, but rather by its quality. The information is considered pertinent if it meets the customer's needs and requirements and then translated in an intelligence report for their use. Policymakers need intelligence reports to support and guide their decisions. The IC serves as a support function and is required to ensure the policymakers receive reports that reflect their needs in a timely manner.²⁹

Members of the IC, including intelligence leaders such as the DNI, are required to possess excellent decision-making skills due to the complex and difficult challenges they encounter every day. Although policymakers direct the intelligence process, the IC is responsible for collecting and sorting through an abundance of information pertaining to a particular subject matter and/or threat and making the most effective and efficient decisions regarding how to collect on it, develop useful analyses, and deliver them to decision makers. They are required to decipher what information is relevant and what sources are credible. As Amanda J. Gookins states in *The Role of Intelligence in Policy Making*, "In order to provide timely reports, intelligence professionals collect, analyze, and synthesize relevant information from various resources, seeking the most current data possible."³⁰ These reports

²⁸ Fingar, Thomas. "Intelligence and Grand Strategy," *Elsevier Limited*, Winter 2012: 118-134. Accessed April 13, 2015, http://fsi.stanford.edu/sites/default/files/Fingar__Intelligence_and_Grand_Strategy.pdf

²⁹ Ibid. http://fsi.stanford.edu/sites/default/files/Fingar__Intelligence_and_Grand_Strategy.pdf

³⁰ Gookins Amanda J. "The Role of Intelligence in Policy Making." *SAIS Review of International Affairs* 28, no. 1 (2008): 66. <https://muse.jhu.edu/>

must adhere to the policymakers' demands to include preference of delivery. Circumstances around the world are continuously changing, which in turn results in constant data change. This forces the IC to make decisions in a timely manner so that all intelligence provided to policymakers is relevant and accurate. The time constraints on the IC limit its collections sources and elevate the sense of urgency to relay proper intelligence to policymakers and military leaders in time to make a difference in the policy arena. Timeliness is equally as important as providing accurate and relevant data. If intelligence reports are not provided promptly, they can become irrelevant as a result of evolving data.

While dealing with time constraints, IC members have to attempt to remain objective while selecting the information they feel is relevant to the presented situation or threat. In general, humans have biases, opinions, and heuristics (rules of thumb) they apply to certain subject matter often subconsciously, based on their prior experiences and/or knowledge.³¹ Christina Shelton refers to this as "scotoma."³² She defines scotoma as "an individual who fails to see facts, or is blind to alternatives, observes only limited possibilities as a result of a sensory locking out of information from the environment."³³ IC members and leaders may gravitate toward data that favors their prior notions without realizing that their intentions derive from bias or epistemologies. According to Gookins, "When new, unrelated information is encountered, the mind may subconsciously discard or misinterpret either the

³¹ Ibid., pg. 69

³² Christina Shelton, "The Roots of Analytic Failures in the US Intelligence Community," *International Journal of Intelligence and Counterintelligence*, 24:4; 2011, pp. 637-654.

³³ Ibid.

event or the significance of the event.”³⁴ Crucial information that can have a detrimental impact on our national security can be overlooked if analysts or their bosses subconsciously discard or misinterpret information. This is why it is extremely important that the IC effectively respond to the changing circumstances around the world. Vision, agility, and creativity are therefore critically important for leaders as well as collectors and analysts. They must always be open and alert to new information and use their analytical and critical-thinking skills to decide if the information is relevant to our national security and how it will impact it, and from there determine how to get the information to policymakers and make sure it “adheres,” as the IC refers to reports that are both useful and used.

It is equally vital that intelligence leaders and their subordinates avoid interpersonal conflicts and interagency infighting as they make their decisions and consider all potential threats and sources of information. Given the realities of large bureaucracies, and especially highly political ones, this is a tall but not hopeless order. Usually, personal events, experience, and cultural factors influence how one interprets information.³⁵ Gookins notes that, “Intelligence failures are often attributed to assumptions and estimates based on biases of the intelligence professional or how intelligence is understood and used on the policymaker’s side.”³⁶ This statement reiterates the importance of understanding the customer and their needs. Failures are more likely to occur when biases are involved, when intelligence is misunderstood by policymakers, and/or does not meet the policymakers’

³⁴ Gookins Amanda J. "The Role of Intelligence in Policy Making." *SAIS Review of International Affairs* 28, no. 1 (2008): 66. <https://muse.jhu.edu/>

³⁵ Ibid., pg. 70

³⁶ Ibid.

requirements. Biases, along with failing to understand the customer, should be avoided throughout the intelligence cycle and during the policy decision-making process. By doing so, the IC leadership is able to establish its credibility with policymakers and help them understand and diffuse complex situations. This, in turn, often helps them to avoid the political entanglements that have ensnared some senior IC officials in recent years.³⁷

An example that has become a main topic when referring to politicization among policymakers and the IC is the events leading up to the Iraq invasion in 2003. After the tragedy of 9/11, the emotional state of our nation was rattled and was used to influence the decisions toward the Iraq invasion. There are many different “excuses” as to why we invaded Iraq that range from blaming the IC for faulty intelligence that led to the assumption of present Weapons of Mass Destruction (WMDs) in Iraq to seeking revenge against Saddam Hussein for the 9/11 tragedy and for a prior rivalry between Hussein and President George W. Bush’s father, President George H. W. Bush.³⁸ The public believes that we invaded Iraq to disarm Iraq’s WMDs and reform the Iraqi Government. For those who have showed more interest in the issue rather than relying on the “facts” of the media, the presence of politicization is evident.

³⁷ An example of a senior IC official who became entangled in politicization is former FBI counterterrorist chief, John O’Neill. O’Neill was the FBI’s leading expert on Al Qaeda and warned policymakers and other entities of their threat to the U.S. FBI officials did not care for O’Neill’s strong personality and used their dislike for his persona against his work abilities and ultimately ignored his work product. O’Neill left the FBI because of these issues, despite his prediction of an attack by Al Qaeda, and worked as head of security at the World Trade Center. Ironically, Al Qaeda attacked the World Trade Centers on 9/11 and O’Neill was killed among the thousands in the World Trade Centers.

³⁸ Pillar, Paul R., *Intelligence and U.S. Foreign Policy: Iraq, 9/11, and Misguided Reform* (New York: Columbia University Press, 2011) pg. 65

Intelligence leaders are responsible for ensuring they produce unbiased intelligence to meet the informational requirements of policymakers, but they are unable to control how that intelligence is used once it is in the customers' hands. The decisions made toward the Iraq invasion were based on intelligence products that were "cherry-picked" by policymakers to support their preconceived notions. As Paul Pillar, an intelligence officer who worked for the CIA, the National Intelligence Council (NIC), and the ODNI, states, "...official intelligence was not relied on in making even the most significant national security decisions, that intelligence was misused publicly to justify decisions already made, that damaging ill will developed between policymakers and intelligence officers, and that the intelligence community's own work was politicized,"³⁹ Policymakers were adamant about what information they needed to gain the support of the American people toward their decision of invading Iraq. Their inflexible and highly demanding approach ultimately had an impact on the way intelligence officers began to think about Iraq.⁴⁰ Intelligence produced by the IC that did not pertain to WMDs in Iraq was ignored and information that gave any indication of WMDs was trumpeted and magnified. Intelligence officers were pushed to produce particular material and hammered by policymakers until that material was produced.⁴¹ The work produced by the IC was politicized through careful and low-key intimidation and

³⁹ Pincus, Walter, "Ex-CIA Official Faults Use of Data on Iraq," *The Washington Post*, February 10, 2006, <http://www.washingtonpost.com/wp-dyn/content/article/2006/02/09/AR2006020902418.html>

⁴⁰ Pillar, Paul R., *Intelligence and U.S. Foreign Policy: Iraq, 9/11, and Misguided Reform* (New York: Columbia University Press, 2011) pg. 147

⁴¹ *Ibid.*, pg. 149

occasional bullying. IC analysts questioned their own work to ensure it met the policymakers' particular needs – in this case, identifying the possibility of WMDs in Iraq.

As previously addressed, intelligence leaders are faced with tasks that require effective and efficient decision-making skills. Simply having the ability to make a decision does not qualify as a leadership skill. Competent leaders are those who are able to make these types of decisions while adhering to high ethical and moral standards. Personal ethical standards and/or morals can influence a decision dramatically. Peter G. Northouse states, “The choices that leaders make and how they respond in a given circumstance are informed and directed by their ethics.”⁴² Intelligence leaders with high ethical and moral standards are able to consider risks and consequences of a decision and make the most effective decisions.

Professor Martin L. Cook at the US Army War College recognizes various levels of moral development through a scale designed by Lawrence Kohlberg, commonly known as “Kohlberg’s Scale.”⁴³ Kohlberg’s Scale is divided into three (3) levels with two (2) sublevels for each level. Each level represents a phase in human maturity as the levels escalate. The levels are categorized as “Pre-Conventional,” “Conventional,” and “Post-Conventional.”⁴⁴ The “Pre-Conventional” level consists of children and socially challenged adults. These individuals’ mindsets are focused on their own self-interests and how certain choices can benefit themselves.⁴⁵ According to Professor Cook, most individuals function at the

⁴² Northouse, Peter G., *Leadership: Theory and Practice*. Thousand Oaks, CA: Sage Publications, 2004. Pg. 302

⁴³ Cook, Martin. “Moral Reasoning as a Strategic Leader Competency”. US Army War College. Pg. 2

⁴⁴ Ibid.

“Conventional” level. The conventional thinker lacks the ability to “think outside of” the moral assumptions of the group or society around [him or] her.”⁴⁶ Their decisions usually reflect the cultural norms and values of the society around them. They make decisions based on society’s values and accept them as the appropriate standards of behavior. The “Post-Conventional” level is the most advanced stage of moral thinking. At this level, individuals are able to “think about moral issues outside the framework of society’s values and assumptions.”⁴⁷ They do not accept what society conforms to as being “correct.” They are able to think beyond society’s values and differentiate between “right” and “wrong.” Leaders are expected to perform at this higher level of moral thinking. They are placed in situations that challenge this level of thinking on a daily basis. For example, they may advise policymakers to eliminate a certain adversary in order to ensure the safety and protection of every citizen in our country. Although killing is considered morally wrong in our society without proper and compelling justification, our leaders’ higher level of moral thinking allows them to place their country’s interest at a higher priority than their own personal interests. As Johnson notes, “...the world of official intelligence involves activities in many grey areas of moral thought, and generates perplexing dilemmas where agents must balance the national interest in security, which they are bound to protect, against some other virtue like the ancient rules against lying, stealing, killing and so forth.”⁴⁸ Those who think at the “Conventional” level allow political agendas and interpersonal conflicts to interfere with

⁴⁵ Ibid., pg. 3

⁴⁶ Ibid.

⁴⁷ Ibid., pg. 4

⁴⁸ Johnson, Loch K. *Handbook of Intelligence Studies*. New York: Routledge, 2009. Pg. 53

their decisions. Effective leaders do not allow such selfish motives to affect their decision-making process, even under political pressure. In fact, truly ethical leaders will resign when they see major improprieties that do not stop even after they have voiced their objections. These kinds of leaders are rare, but we need more of them in the IC and elsewhere. They make an effort to consider the potential outcomes and consequences rather than making an impulse decision or a decision based on society's values or a politician's preferences and pressure. The latter is, of course, particularly challenging since increasing numbers of senior intelligence leaders are political appointees.

Intelligence leaders must think at the "Post-Conventional" level in order to provide the best analysis of relevant information to policymakers for their final decisions. Without the ability to think at a high moral level, their decisions can result in poor quality of intelligence and cause harm to our national security. Exercising high ethical and moral standards also plays a vital role in leadership accountability. Respectable, ethical leaders take responsibility and are accountable for every decision they make and those made by their subordinates, whether the outcome is good or bad.⁴⁹ Retired General Stephen R. Lorenz emphasizes the accountability of senior leaders, such as intelligence leaders by stating, "We are still accountable for our own choices and that of our people, but we are also accountable for outcomes."⁵⁰ This statement highlights and reiterates the importance of the decision-making process. Senior leaders are accountable for decisions made not only by themselves, but also by their subordinates. Accountability also builds trust among subordinates and the

⁴⁹ General Lorenz, Stephen R., "Lorenz on Leadership: Accountability in Public Life." Air Education and Training Command News Story. <http://www.aetc.af.mil/news/story.asp?id=123327873>

⁵⁰ Ibid. <http://www.aetc.af.mil/news/story.asp?id=123327873>

American people. Leaders who are accountable for their actions and of those actions made by their subordinates take corrective action when a decision results in an unfavorable outcome. Obviously, with a favorable outcome, accountability is praised and acknowledged to an even greater degree. Those leaders in our Federal Government who take the initiative to correct an unfavorable outcome or an unethical problem show their subordinates and the American people that they care enough to acknowledge mistakes and abuses of power, and to take the appropriate actions to correct them.

Accountability is a reflection of an effective leader. Unfortunately, not all of those appointed and selected as leaders exercise the same responsibilities as others and can fall prey to a need to please the public and the media. On July 3, 1988, Captain Will Rogers commanded the USS *Vincennes* in the Persian Gulf to protect neutral shipping.⁵¹ While attempting to protect this shipping from spillover effects of the ongoing war between Iran and Iraq, Captain Rogers ordered his subordinates to shoot down a plane that was headed towards the USS *Vincennes*, which he believed to be an Iranian F-14 ready to attack.⁵² After ordering the shoot down, Captain Rogers and the rest of the crew discovered that what was originally thought to be an Iranian F-14 was actually an Iranian commercial airliner flight carrying 290 passengers plus their crew. All passengers and crew on the flight were killed.⁵³

The Iranian commercial airliner flight had left Bandar Abbas seven (7) minutes before the USS *Vincennes* shot it down. Therefore, the Captain of the aircraft was

⁵¹ Rabun, Patrick C. "Some Tactical Mistakes Have Theater-Strategic Consequences" Naval War College. Newport, R.I. 6 November 2007. Pg. 5

⁵² Ibid.

⁵³ Ibid., pg. 5-6

monitoring the control frequencies and air traffic control at Tehran Center while the USS *Vincennes* was broadcasting its warning messages on military and international air distress frequencies.⁵⁴ Although there was a transmission made by the frigate USS *Sides* that made it evident the message was directed at the Iranian commercial airline, its “transponder, which is equivalent to the military’s ‘identification friend or foe’ (IFF) electronics, was broadcasting the unique code of a commercial airliner.”⁵⁵ Captain Rogers authorized firing anti-aircraft missiles when the Iranian commercial airliner was 11 miles away. It was learned minutes after shooting down the aircraft that the USS *Sides*’ combat information center correctly identified the aircraft’s code as a commercial airliner at the exact moment the USS *Vincennes* fired its missiles.

Captain Rogers’ aggressiveness hastened his decision and led to the death of innocent passengers en route to Dubai. A difference of seconds could have saved these individuals’ lives. Captain Rogers’ hurried and aggressive attitude interfered with his ability to make a sound decision. Although he felt he made the best decision, he did not hold himself accountable for the outcome of his actions, nor did the U.S. Navy. Instead, the U.S. Navy and Captain Rogers made excuses and lies to justify the killings of the 290 passengers aboard the Iranian commercial aircraft.⁵⁶ The intelligence was available, yet Captain Rogers chose to rush his decision, which affected the lives of several people, but also affected his abilities

⁵⁴ Lt. Col. Evans, David. “Vincennes - A Case Study” (presentation, University of New Mexico - Naval Science 304: Navigation and Naval Operations II, Albuquerque, NM) <http://www.unm.edu/~nrotc/ns304/lesson20.htm>

⁵⁵ Ibid. <http://www.unm.edu/~nrotc/ns304/lesson20.htm>

⁵⁶ Rabun, Patrick C. “Some Tactical Mistakes Have Theater-Strategic Consequences” Naval War College. Newport, R.I. 6 November 2007. Pg. 6

as a leader. If there was any doubt that Captain Rogers did not make the best decision considering the circumstances, the U.S. Navy would not have made excuses and told lies. The truth would have been enough to justify his decision. That was obviously not the case. The truth revealed poor decision-making skills and also revealed the lack of accountability among the U.S. Navy leaders. Had Captain Rogers held fire until he had the crucial intelligence he needed – intelligence he knew would be on the way from the various ships' CICs along with intelligence already received that the aircraft has not locked radar onto any American ships – he would have averted disaster.

Education

In any profession, aspiring leaders must continue their education to develop knowledge and enhance their skills for their position. Leaders are required to further their education in areas and matters they are ultimately responsible for, despite any lack of expertise, in an attempt to develop their profession. Intelligence leaders must be knowledgeable in all areas of the intelligence cycle and related processes, to include levels of threats and high-risk situations. They are required to understand the operational functions and implications of the intelligence process and enhance the skills needed to analyze new and existing threats to our national security. Bridging the gap between concepts and practice, and bringing them together into a useful whole, is particularly important in the intelligence profession. This is the leadership's responsibility.

There are various programs available to intelligence leaders to continue their professional development and further their leadership skills as intelligence professionals. One educational source available to intelligence professionals is the academic expertise offered at the National Intelligence University (NIU). NIU was founded in 1962 and is based

in Washington, D.C. inside the Defense Intelligence Agency (DIA) Headquarters at the Joint Base Anacostia Bolling (JBAB).⁵⁷ This academic institution offers three degrees in the intelligence field: a Bachelor of Science in Intelligence, a Master of Science of Strategic Intelligence, and a Master of Science and Technology Intelligence.⁵⁸ According to NIU, their mission states: “Through dynamic teaching and learning, original research, and worldwide engagement, the NIU offers relevant, accessible, and career-long intelligence education that provides members of the intelligence and national security communities with knowledge, analytical skills, and a strategic awareness of the critical role intelligence plays in the security of the nation.”⁵⁹ The NIU mission is to shape intelligence professionals into competent leaders to maximize efforts to protect and improve our national security. NIU offers courses that prepare and educate intelligence leaders on how to handle current and future challenges involving our national security. In order successfully to accomplish this mission, NIU has established strategic goals to be achieved upon each student’s degree completion:

1. “Develop strategic leaders capable of objectivity and critical thinking, in an academic environment that fosters a comprehensive understanding of the IC.”⁶⁰
2. “Produce and publish value-added research that develops analytical and creative thinking skills, contributes to the intelligence mission, and sparks innovation.”⁶¹

⁵⁷ “Locations,” *National Intelligence University*, accessed October 8, 2014 <http://ni-u.edu/wp/about-niu/locations/>

⁵⁸ “About NIU,” *National Intelligence University*, accessed October 8, 2014, <http://ni-u.edu/wp/about-niu/>

⁵⁹ Ibid. <http://ni-u.edu/wp/about-niu/>

⁶⁰ Ibid. <http://ni-u.edu/wp/about-niu/>

3. “Serve as an academic catalyst for national and international IC engagement.”⁶²
4. “Enhance the integration of the IC through personal and professional relationships established in university programs.”⁶³

If each is accomplished, these strategic goals can help members of the IC become proficient leaders.

The NIU is a well-known institution that focuses specifically on the intelligence profession, but there are other programs offered that are also directed toward the IC and their functionality. These include courses offered through The Armed Forces Communications and Electronics Association (AFCEA).⁶⁴ This association offers a variety of intelligence courses to professionals to increase their understanding of the IC and its function. Some of these courses have the privilege of being taught by Dr. Mark M. Lowenthal, who is an internationally recognized expert on intelligence and a retired senior CIA leader.⁶⁵ His courses provide an overview of the IC’s operational functions and current challenges for government, military, academic, and contractor professionals who continuously interact with the IC.⁶⁶

⁶¹ Ibid. <http://ni-u.edu/wp/about-niu/>

⁶² Ibid. <http://ni-u.edu/wp/about-niu/>

⁶³ Ibid. <http://ni-u.edu/wp/about-niu/>

⁶⁴ “The Intelligence Community: An Overview,” *AFCEA Education Foundation*, accessed October 8, 2014 http://www.afcea.org/education/details.cfm?course_number=203-14-FXVA-1

⁶⁵ Ibid. http://www.afcea.org/education/details.cfm?course_number=203-14-FXVA-1

⁶⁶ Ibid. http://www.afcea.org/education/details.cfm?course_number=203-14-FXVA-1

In recent news, NIU has worked with the Federal Bureau of Investigations (FBI) and Marine Corps Intelligence Activity to create the NIU Quantico Academic Center.⁶⁷

Concerning its focus, NIU President Dr. David Ellison states that the academic center “supports the Director of National Intelligence guidance to make intelligence education, research, and outreach opportunities accessible to the entire intelligence community, and to operate within the larger context of improving intelligence integration.”⁶⁸

Another institution that can enhance intelligence leaders’ skills and help develop their knowledge of our national security is The Institute of World Politics (IWP). This institute is not aimed toward intelligence professionals specifically, but focuses on statecraft, national security, and international affairs.⁶⁹ As their mission states, “The Institute of World Politics is a graduate school of national security and international affairs, dedicated to developing leaders with a sound understanding of international realities and the ethical conduct of statecraft, based on knowledge and appreciation of the founding principles of the American political economy and the Western moral tradition.”⁷⁰

Although the IWP does not focus academics solely on intelligence professionals, it has educational agreements and relationships with a number of IC agencies. Due to the

⁶⁷ “Locations,” *National Intelligence University*, accessed October 8, 2014 <http://niu.edu/wp/about-niu/locations/>

⁶⁸ “Making Intelligence Education More Accessible: NIU Open Academic Center in Quantico,” *National Intelligence University*, accessed October 8, 2014 <http://niu.edu/wp/making-intelligence-education-more-accessible-niu-opens-academic-center-in-quantico/>

⁶⁹ “About IWP,” *The Institute of World Politics*, accessed October 8, 2014 <http://www.iwp.edu/about/>

⁷⁰ “Mission,” *The Institute of World Politics*, accessed October 8, 2014 <http://www.iwp.edu/about/page/mission>

sensitivity of intelligence, these agreements and relationships are not discussed in public materials.⁷¹

Efforts to integrate the various agencies within the IC have resulted in recurring problems and have sometimes had a negative effect on the operational functions of the intelligence process. Intelligence agencies have been found to be reluctant to share information with each other for various reasons. This issue was addressed in the 2004 reform legislation with the creation of the DNI. The DNI is “to have access to all intelligence and is responsible for ensuring that it is disseminated as needed across the intelligence community.”⁷² Although the DNI was created to help eliminate this issue, agencies within the IC continue to have trouble in this area. Their collaboration efforts can be affected by the number of agencies within the IC and/or “ownership” of their respective product. Implementing the key elements of this intelligence-integration into educational curricula and operational tools for the IC is vitally important. If the IC agencies work harder at combining their efforts, and educating one another about how best to do so, our intelligence needs can be met more effectively and efficiently.

Training

There are many training programs offered to professionals responsible for protecting our national security, to include intelligence leaders and the IC. Although it is not feasible to address the countless available programs and courses, there are several offered through

⁷¹ “Academic Programs for Defense & Intelligence Leadership,” *The Institute of World Politics*, accessed October 8, 2014 <http://www.iwp.edu/programs/detail/academic-programs-for-defense-intelligence-leadership>

⁷² Lowenthal, Mark M., *Intelligence from Secrets to Policy*. Washington, DC: CQ Press, 2009. Pg. 29

government agencies that can enhance the skills of intelligence leaders and help them become better at their jobs.

One government agency that offers leadership training to government officials is the Office of Personnel Management (OPM). “The OPM provides human resources, leadership, and support to Federal agencies and helps the Federal workforce achieve their aspirations as they serve the American people,” according to the OPM website.⁷³ They have developed leadership tools that are based on leadership assessment experience and primarily focus on improving leadership within the Federal Government. The tools developed by the OPM are used to improve leadership qualities within an established leader, assist agencies with identifying leaders and those who present leadership potential, and help transition new leaders into their new roles.⁷⁴ The OPM offers two particular training programs aimed at developing leaders. The first is the Federal Leadership Development Programs (FedLDP). The trainee is able to select a leadership development program by agency, pay level, and/or targeted audience scope. For example, intelligence leaders would engage in training programs under the Department of Defense/Defense Intelligence Agency (DOD/DIA).⁷⁵ One particular training program under the DOD/DIA is the Joint Military Intelligence

⁷³ “Our Mission, Role & History,” *U.S. Office of Personnel Management*, accessed October 8, 2014 <http://www.opm.gov/about-us/our-mission-role-history/what-we-do/>

⁷⁴ “Federal Leadership Development Programs,” *U.S. Office of Personnel Management*, accessed October 8, 2014 <http://www.opm.gov/services-for-agencies/federal-leadership-development-programs/#url=Search-the-Catalogue>

⁷⁵ *Ibid.* <http://www.opm.gov/services-for-agencies/federal-leadership-development-programs/#url=Search-the-Catalogue>

Training Center (JMITC).⁷⁶ JMITC offers training to intelligence professionals on the “evolving core intelligence tradecraft learning requirements of DIA and other Department of Defense, Intelligence Community, and Allied Intelligence professionals.”⁷⁷ This course ultimately trains its students to adapt to the demands of the intelligence agencies and professionals during given situations.⁷⁸

The second training opportunity offered by the OPM is its Center for Leadership Development. This training program works with high-performing leaders, supervisors, managers, and executives to enhance their leadership and management skills.⁷⁹ For those leaders who strive to be more competent and continuously aspire to improve their skills, the OPM offers custom leadership development and training courses to fit their specific needs.⁸⁰ They offer programs for all levels of federal careers, to include management and team development courses and collaborative leadership courses that are primarily built on the Executive Core Qualifications set out by the OPM. These qualifications include: leading

⁷⁶ “Joint Military Intelligence Training Center (JMITC),” *Defense Intelligence Agency*, accessed October 8, 2014
[http://www.dia.mil/Training/JointMilitaryIntelligenceTrainingCenter\(JMITC.aspx](http://www.dia.mil/Training/JointMilitaryIntelligenceTrainingCenter(JMITC.aspx)

⁷⁷ Ibid. [http://www.dia.mil/Training/JointMilitaryIntelligenceTrainingCenter\(JMITC.aspx](http://www.dia.mil/Training/JointMilitaryIntelligenceTrainingCenter(JMITC.aspx)

⁷⁸ Ibid. [http://www.dia.mil/Training/JointMilitaryIntelligenceTrainingCenter\(JMITC.aspx](http://www.dia.mil/Training/JointMilitaryIntelligenceTrainingCenter(JMITC.aspx)

⁷⁹ “About Us,” *Center for Leadership Development*, accessed October 8, 2014
<http://cldcentral.usalearning.net/mod/page/view.php?id=234>

⁸⁰ “Custom Leadership Development and Training Solutions,” *Center for Leadership Development*, accessed October 8, 2014
<http://cldcentral.usalearning.net/mod/page/view.php?id=257>

change, leading people, results driven, business acumen, and building coalitions.⁸¹ The OPM recognizes the importance of quality leadership and works to emphasize these core qualifications by providing career-long education and training.

There are several training programs/courses available not only to improve the intelligence process for intelligence leaders, but to also improve specific leadership skills. As previously mentioned, leaders are expected to exercise high ethical and moral standards. Therefore they must strive to improve by engaging in exercises and practices that will help them further their ethical and moral development.

The Office of the DNI has addressed certain principles that IC professionals are responsible for maintaining regardless of their title or position. According to the ODNI, these principles “reflect the standard of ethical conduct expected of all Intelligence Community personnel, regardless of individual role or agency affiliation.”⁸² These principles include their mission, truth, lawfulness, integrity, stewardship, excellence, and diversity. It is the individuals’ responsibility to ensure their conduct is in accordance with these principles. The ODNI has assigned the Designated Agency Ethics Official (DAEO), who is also the General Counsel, a leadership oversight position to ensure that members of the IC exercise those principles.⁸³

⁸¹ “Senior Executive Service – Executive Core Qualifications,” *U.S. Office of Personnel Management*, accessed October 8, 2014 <http://www.opm.gov/policy-data-oversight/senior-executive-service/executive-core-qualifications/>

⁸² “Principles of Professional Ethics for the Intelligence Community,” *Office of the Director of National Intelligence*, accessed October 8, 2014 <http://www.dni.gov/index.php/intelligence-community/principles-of-professional-ethics>

In order to ensure that these principles are practiced, there are many ethics-training courses available not only to intelligence leaders, but also to other leaders in our federal government. In particular, the United States Office of Government Ethics (OGE) was created to “Provide overall leadership and oversight of the executive branch ethics program designed to prevent and resolve conflicts of interest.”⁸⁴ The OGE works with over 5,000 ethics officials to implement the program in over 130 agencies.⁸⁵ The OGE is responsible for implementing and advising government officials of ethical laws and policies. They are also responsible for holding those officials accountable for carrying out the material learned and properly applying it. They are not responsible for any ethical violations and direct those issues to the Office of the Inspector General (OIG).⁸⁶

Although these training courses are a small portion of all the ethics training opportunities available to intelligence leaders, the DoD has also provided a list of online resources available for Federal and Non-Federal Government employees to engage in additional ethical training opportunities.⁸⁷ Leaders must strive continuously to be highly ethical and moral, to follow the law, and to foster these traits in their subordinates.

⁸³ “Designated Agency Ethics Official,” *Office of the Director of National Intelligence*, accessed October 8, 2014 <http://www.dni.gov/index.php/about/leadership/designated-agency-ethics-officer>

⁸⁴ “Mission & Responsibilities,” *United States Office of Government Ethics*, accessed October 8, 2014 <http://www.oge.gov/About/Mission-and-Responsibilities/Mission---Responsibilities/>

⁸⁵ Ibid. <http://www.oge.gov/About/Mission-and-Responsibilities/Mission---Responsibilities/>

⁸⁶ Ibid. <http://www.oge.gov/About/Mission-and-Responsibilities/Mission---Responsibilities/>

⁸⁷ “Ethics Resources on the Web,” *U.S. Department of Defense*, accessed October 8, 2014 http://www.dod.mil/dodgc/defense_ethics/resource_library/resourcesindex.html

Intelligence leaders have resources available to improve these qualities, and it is incumbent upon them to utilize them.

Since the intelligence arena involves the use and handling of classified material, it is vital that intelligence leaders ensure they and their subordinates are properly trained to handle such material. In 2013, DNI James Clapper signed a Directive addressing the implementation and oversight of the IC classification management and control markings system.⁸⁸ Under the new Directive, those who are granted access to classified information are required to attend training to ensure their complete understanding of the classification and control markings system pursuant to EO 13526.⁸⁹ Misuse or mishandling of classified material can result in a breach of our national security and jeopardize the lives of American citizens. Along with the educational expertise provided at the NIU, it is the only institution that offers research in the Top Secret/Sensitive Compartmentalized Information (TS/SCI) arena.⁹⁰ Due to the sensitivity of this classified material and the potential effects that its compromise may have on our national security, policy should be clear and consistent. To clarify security policy and place higher restrictions on it, the DoD established the Defense Security Enterprise (DSE) “to protect DoD personnel, information, operations, resources,

⁸⁸ Clapper, James R., “Classification Management and Control Markings System,” *Office of the Director of National Intelligence – Intelligence Community Directive 710*, June 21, 2013.

⁸⁹ Ibid.

⁹⁰ “National Intelligence University (NIU),” *Defense Intelligence Agency*, accessed October 8, 2014 [http://www.dia.mil/Training/NationalIntelligenceUniversity\(NIU\).aspx](http://www.dia.mil/Training/NationalIntelligenceUniversity(NIU).aspx)

technologies, and facilities.”⁹¹ The DSE has defined three goals to manage security improvements:

1. Standardize security functions across DoD to achieve synergistic execution and enhance operations.⁹²
2. Allocate security resources to demonstrate a return on investment.⁹³
3. Improve individual performance to develop a cadre of highly skilled security professionals.⁹⁴

The success in reaching these goals is highly dependent on the professionals working toward them, and in particular on the quality of training they receive. The DoD’s Defense Security Service (DSS) has established The Center for Development of Security Excellence (CDSE) in order to provide security education, training, and certification products and services to those professionals responsible for the protection of our national security, to include intelligence leaders.⁹⁵ The CDSE “provides development, delivery, and exchange of security knowledge to ensure a high-performing workforce capable of addressing our Nation’s security challenges.”⁹⁶

⁹¹ Department of Defense. *Defense Security Enterprise Strategic Plan*. Pg. 3. retrieved from <http://fas.org/sgp/othergov/dod/dse-plan.pdf>

⁹² Ibid. <http://fas.org/sgp/othergov/dod/dse-plan.pdf>

⁹³ Ibid. <http://fas.org/sgp/othergov/dod/dse-plan.pdf>

⁹⁴ Ibid. <http://fas.org/sgp/othergov/dod/dse-plan.pdf>

⁹⁵ “About CDSE,” *Department of Defense – Defense Security Service*, accessed October 8, 2014, <http://www.cdse.edu/about.html>

⁹⁶ Ibid. <http://www.cdse.edu/about.html>

The National Counterintelligence Executive (NCIX; also known as the Director of National Counterintelligence) also offers a course “intended to train IC element personnel, providing a complete and common understanding of the classification and control markings system (as directed by the Intelligence Community Directive (ICD) 710)” called *The Classification Management and the IC Markings System*.⁹⁷ The IC, its leaders, and other personnel authorized to handle classified material are responsible for safeguarding the information in accordance with national policy to ensure it is secure against unauthorized disclosure. By understanding the customer, as intelligence leaders and the IC should, intelligence leaders are able to ensure the reports produced are in safe hands and can minimize the risk of leaks. The risk becomes greater when intelligence reports are delivered to agencies and/or individuals who either have little use for the information produced or minimized involvement in the situation at hand. Our adversaries long for inconsistency and/or some sort of mishap on our end in order to gain easy access to classified material. Proper and consistent training for all authorized personnel will help reduce the possibilities for any inconsistency and breach of material.

Our nation’s fragile security structure can potentially be compromised by the mishandling of a secure document at the hands of an inexperienced intelligence official or, worse, as a result of insider or external espionage. Because so many of these documents are now online, and not always on Intelink or other self-contained intelligence systems, the number of security compromises continues to increase. The importance of proper handling

⁹⁷ “Web Based Training – Course Descriptions,” *Office of the Director of National Intelligence – National Counterintelligence and Security Center*, accessed October 8, 2014 <http://www.ncsc.gov/training/wbt.php>

and management of secure documents cannot be stressed enough. If intelligence leaders or their subordinates have questions about a document's classification, it is their responsibility to seek appropriate guidance and training to properly educate/train themselves in the handling of these types of documents.

Experience

An intelligence leader can receive all of the education and training available to him, but he will not be as effective in his duties as one who has accumulated valuable professional experience. There is no substitute for professional experience. It helps an individual develop maturity, character, and intuition – all critically important qualities for intelligence senior leaders. Experience is one of the most essential attributes of a leader, especially when understanding and meeting their customers' needs. Leaders with extensive experience can better attest what information is needed to satisfy the customers' requirements and how to satisfy them. Experience is also a direct reflection of a leader's ability effectively to apply the relevant sources of education and training. Through relevant experience, our intelligence leaders are able to contribute their insights toward the development of effective education and training and can themselves relate education and training insights to their real-world experiences in order to develop deeper understanding and superior habits of mind. Education and training are elements used to achieve a favorable outcome to increase the quality of experience for a leader, or to help them learn from and avoid repeating various unfavorable outcomes. A favorable outcome can be described as successfully completing a task or achieving the goals presented within an agency. For example, as previously stated, a major goal within the IC right now is intelligence integration. The ODNI's mission is to "Lead Intelligence Integration and Forge an Intelligence Community that delivers the most

insightful intelligence possible.”⁹⁸ The leadership of a given IC agency is not and will not ever be expert in the workings of every agency within the IC. They would have to know the ins and outs of 17 different agencies, which would be virtually impossible. In order to enhance and strengthen their experiences to serve as better leaders, they must focus on the fluid integration of each agency within the IC. Their vision should be to coordinate the efforts of all IC agencies into a synchronized machine to handle a broad range of threats. Intelligence leaders should have direct relationships with every agency to properly unify their efforts. Although agencies may view this unified approach as an attempt to hinder their individual abilities to make decisions in their best interests, it is more an attempt to enhance the efficiencies of the IC. In order successfully to achieve intelligence integration, there must be an increase of morale and understanding for the integration. The chances for success are greater for the IC and its leaders if all agencies combine their efforts to combat and diffuse external and internal threats.

The DNI has challenged intelligence leaders to translate the vision of integrating intelligence agencies’ capabilities into a reality in which information-sharing and other forms of close coordination are the norm.⁹⁹ The vision states, “Our leaders will need to transcend the traditional independent, agency-centric orientation, and move toward a leadership style based on cross-agency collaboration and interdisciplinary experience.”¹⁰⁰ This will challenge intelligence leaders to build coalitions across agencies and their various cultures to unify

⁹⁸ “Mission, Vision & Goals,” *Office of the Director of National Intelligence*, accessed October 8, 2014 <http://www.dni.gov/index.php/about/mission>

⁹⁹ “Vision 2015 – A Globally Networked and Integrated Intelligence Enterprise,” *Office of the Director of National Intelligence*, (2015): pg. 15. http://www.au.af.mil/au/awc/awcgate/dni/vision_2015_july08.pdf

¹⁰⁰ Ibid. http://www.au.af.mil/au/awc/awcgate/dni/vision_2015_july08.pdf

their efforts in achieving mission objectives.¹⁰¹ Intelligence leaders can become more effective with a successful integration, which leads to a more worthwhile and benefitting experience as a leader. Although integrating agencies within the IC will not be an easy task considering the recurring problems that have surfaced in response to its multiple attempts, leadership successes will be more frequent and pronounced if this vision of integration is translated into a reality.

¹⁰¹ Ibid. http://www.au.af.mil/au/awc/awcgate/dni/vision_2015_july08.pdf

CHAPTER III

CASE STUDIES

2012 Benghazi Attack

On September 11, 2012, 11 years after our nation experienced terrorist attacks, U.S. Ambassador Christopher Stevens, Foreign Service Information Officer Sean Smith, and two former Navy SEALs, Glen Doherty and Tyrone Woods were killed by Islamic militants who attacked the U.S. Mission in Benghazi, Libya. The attack began around 9:40 pm when dozens of armed men approached the U.S. Mission. The front gate was bombarded and the Islamic militants began setting fire to the mission, to include the Villa C, where Ambassador Stevens and Officer Sean Smith were located.¹⁰² The heavy smoke forced those occupying the Villa C to escape from the building despite repeated gunfire, but was unsuccessful as they lost the Ambassador amidst the smoke and failed to locate him after repeated searches.¹⁰³

Several security officers were notified of the incident, to include the Benghazi CIA security team and the State Department Regional Security Officer (RSO) in Tripoli, and prepared to defend themselves against Islamic militants in search of Ambassador Stevens and in an attempt to save other personnel.¹⁰⁴ The RSO in Tripoli notified the CIA's security

¹⁰² Rogers, Mike, and Ruppertsberger, C.A., *Investigative Report on the Terrorist Attacks on U.S. Facilities in Benghazi, Libya, September 11-12, 2012*, (U.S. House of Representatives 113th Congress, November 21, 2014), pg. 7-8.
<https://intelligence.house.gov/sites/intelligence.house.gov/files/documents/Benghazi%20Report.pdf>

¹⁰³ *Ibid.*, pg. 8,
<https://intelligence.house.gov/sites/intelligence.house.gov/files/documents/Benghazi%20Report.pdf>

team in Tripoli and made the decision to form the “Tripoli Team” that consisted of CIA security and U.S. military officers (five CIA and two U.S. military), to include Navy SEALs Glen Doherty and Tyrone Woods.¹⁰⁵ While their mission was to locate Ambassador Stevens, the Tripoli Team experienced several delays that complicated this mission. After they were notified that Ambassador’s Stevens’ body was identified at the hospital, the Chief of Station in Tripoli ordered the team to resume their original task of collecting non-security personnel and evacuating them from the Benghazi Annex to the airport for transportation to Tripoli.¹⁰⁶

Once they arrived at the Annex, the Tripoli Team split up to locate and evacuate personnel as instructed. Glen Doherty climbed up to the roof of the main building to assist Tyrone Woods with security.¹⁰⁷ Shortly after, the Annex was attacked by terrorists that included small fires and five mortar rounds. Four out of the five mortars were direct hits and took the lives of Glen Doherty and Tyrone Woods.¹⁰⁸ After the attack, the security team leaders asked for approval to evacuate the Annex since it was determined they could not secure the Annex and lacked the appropriate weapons. Their approval was granted and

¹⁰⁴ Ibid.

<https://intelligence.house.gov/sites/intelligence.house.gov/files/documents/Benghazi%20Report.pdf>

¹⁰⁵ Ibid., pg. 8, 11

¹⁰⁶ Ibid., pg. 10-11

¹⁰⁷ Ibid., pg. 11

¹⁰⁸ Ibid.

security leaders led all U.S. personnel, including all four dead Americans, to the Benghazi airport to arrive in Tripoli.¹⁰⁹

The lives of Ambassador Stevens, Officer Smith, and Navy SEALs Doherty and Woods could have been saved had proper security measures been taken. Several requests were sent for heightened security and leaders failed to take the appropriate measures to ensure the safety of these Americans. Policymakers became lazy and failed to act with a sense of urgency. An unclassified report completed by the Accountability Review Board (ARB) for the Benghazi attacks addresses these leadership failures. It states, “Communication, cooperation, and coordination among Washington, Tripoli, and Benghazi functioned collegially at the working-level but were constrained by a lack of transparency, responsiveness, and leadership at the senior levels.”¹¹⁰

Months prior to the attack, there were two other attacks against the U.S. Mission, on April 6 and June 6, 2012, which caused Ambassador Stevens to request additional security.¹¹¹ The Ambassador made several requests and recommendations to the State Department after these attacks that were never fulfilled or responded to. The U.S. Senate Select Committee on Intelligence’s Review of the September 11, 2012 attacks identifies several of these requests and sufficient evidence that displays the lack of effort on behalf of the State Department.

¹⁰⁹ Ibid., pg. 3

¹¹⁰ “Accountability Review Board (ARB) Report,” *United States Department of State*, accessed February 21, 2015, pg. 6
<http://www.state.gov/documents/organization/202446.pdf>

¹¹¹ U.S. Senate Select Committee on Intelligence, *Review of the Terrorist Attacks on U.S. Facilities in Benghazi, Libya, September 11-12, 2012 together with Additional Views*, (U.S. Senate Select Committee on Intelligence 113th Congress, January 15, 2014), pg. 12,
<http://www.intelligence.senate.gov/benghazi2014/benghazi.pdf>

A few “excuses” the review addresses for lack of security includes a possible confusion of who was ultimately responsible to make the security related decisions and how the U.S. Mission was a temporary facility and there was uncertainty concerning the future of the Mission.¹¹² The review mentions how the State Department claims they made physical security improvements to the Mission, but the classified ARB report states otherwise. The ARB report found that the Mission compound “included a weak and very extended perimeter, and incomplete interior fence, no mantraps and unhardened entry gates and doors. Benghazi was also severely under-resourced with regard to weapons, ammunition, [non-lethal deterrents] and fire safety equipment, including escape masks.”¹¹³ Ultimately, there was more security at the Annex than at the Mission. Reports state that there were additional surveillance cameras installed at the Mission, but the ARB reports that they were non-functional, including the main gate camera on the day of the attacks, because the State Department failed to send out a technician team to properly install them.¹¹⁴

Failure to administer proper security measures reflected a lack of leadership on behalf of policymakers and the IC. Although there is evidence of intelligence reports, none of the reports presented to policymakers contain “tactical warning” of the specific attacks.¹¹⁵ There are reports that indicate such information concerning the attacks was received by a Transitional National Council (TNC) security officer in Benghazi, but he was unable to deliver the information efficiently to the Libyan Intelligence Service (LIS) because the only

¹¹² Ibid., pg. 16-17

¹¹³ Ibid., pg. 17

¹¹⁴ Ibid., pg. 18

¹¹⁵ Ibid., pg. 23

contacts he had were out of the country.¹¹⁶ This information, of course, did not reach the IC until after the attacks. Even if there was not specific intelligence addressing this specific attacks and a step-by-step outline of what was going to happen prior to the attacks, that does not mean the extremist groups were not capable of them.

The IC is not only responsible for collecting reliable intelligence that gives hard facts of a specific issue, but is also responsible for understanding our enemies and their capabilities and translating those to policymakers. The problem is when such capabilities are identified, but nothing is done about it. The U.S. Senate Select Committee on Intelligence's Review of the September 11, 2012 attacks states the IC was familiar with the Islamic extremist groups' capabilities. It states, "...intelligence reports made clear that extremist groups in eastern Libya, including Ansar al-Sharia, were not only running training camps there, but also plotting and carrying out attacks against U.S. and Western interests in the months prior to the attacks in Benghazi."¹¹⁷ If the IC was aware of the potentiality of terroristic attacks against U.S. interests, then why did we fail to take the appropriate measures in preventing and preparing to combat those attacks? Was this information not "enough" intelligence for intelligence leaders to bring this issue to policymakers' attention? Since the intelligence did not specify an exact date for an attack, was it not "red-flag" material?

For intelligence leaders, all intelligence that identifies a potential threat upon U.S. interests should be a "red-flag." Leaders who have the proper education, training, and experience take immediate action to ensure proper measures are taken to combat any

¹¹⁶ Ibid.

¹¹⁷ Ibid., pg. 24

potential threats that may occur. The IC did, in fact, take immediate action, but in the aftermath of the attack. A statement made by the Director of Public Affairs for ODNI, Shawn Turner states the IC initially believed the attack to be spontaneous. After further analysis, new information indicated that it was planned and an organized terrorist attack.¹¹⁸

Was this intelligence available before the attacks? Could this information that ultimately led the IC to confirm this was a terrorist attack been overlooked? Intelligence collection is the most important step in the intelligence process. If there is not collected information on a specific matter, then there is basically no knowledge of that specific matter.

Intelligence leaders have the responsibility of ensuring they utilize all resources available to them to collect the most relevant and accurate intelligence, especially since technology is advancing and developing so rapidly around the world, to include social media sources. There is blame that not enough intelligence was collected to detect tactical warning of the attacks. According to the U.S. Senate Select Committee on Intelligence's Review of the September 11, 2012 attacks, "...there were fragmentary reports from the IC indicating that more in-depth intelligence exploitation of social media in the Benghazi area, including web postings by Libyan nationals employed at the Temporary Mission Facility, could have flagged potential security threats to the Mission facility or important information about the

¹¹⁸ "Statement by the Director of Public Affairs for ODNI, Shawn Turner, on the Intelligence Related to the Terrorist Attack on the U.S. Consulate in Benghazi, Libya," *Office of the Director of National Intelligence*, (Washington, DC, September 28, 2012), <http://www.dni.gov/index.php/newsroom/press-releases/96-press-releases-2012/731-statement-by-the-odni-s-director-of-public-affairs-on-intelligence-related-to-the-terrorist-attack-on-the-u-s-consulate-in-benghazi>

employees prior to the September 11, 2012 attacks.”¹¹⁹ The IC failed to utilize all resources available. Considering the environment surrounding the U.S. Mission, intelligence leaders should have anticipated an attack (especially after the previous two attacks in April and June) and actively searched for related intelligence in every source available. They should have been on an alert considering the nature of the extremist groups and their ill intent toward U.S. interests.

All of these “excuses” do not justify the killings of Ambassador Stevens, Officer Smith, and Navy SEALs Doherty and Woods. There was intelligence that was overlooked and/or not collected and poor decisions that were made (or lack thereof) by policymakers, all of which resulted in these four deaths. The IC, to include its leaders, failed fully to understand and educate themselves about the extremist militias in Libya and the potential threats they pose to U.S. interests.¹²⁰ These results reflect the importance of proper education, training, and experience.

In all cases, there is always room for improvement as nothing is done perfectly, but in this particular case study, the need for improvement is imperative in order to prevent similar failures. As previously stated, understanding the enemy and its capabilities was a significant part of the intelligence failure. The IC and its leaders did not properly educate themselves of the enemy and missed out on valuable intelligence that could have prevented the September

¹¹⁹ U.S. Senate Select Committee on Intelligence, *Review of the Terrorist Attacks on U.S. Facilities in Benghazi, Libya, September 11-12, 2012 together with Additional Views*, (U.S. Senate Select Committee on Intelligence 113th Congress, January 15, 2014), pg. 25, <http://www.intelligence.senate.gov/benghazi2014/benghazi.pdf>

¹²⁰ “Accountability Review Board (ARB) Report,” *United States Department of State*, accessed February 21, 2015, pg. 7 <http://www.state.gov/documents/organization/202446.pdf>

11, 2012 Benghazi attacks. Not only should the IC and its leaders educate themselves about the enemy, but they should also take the initiative to educate and train themselves for high-threat situations, such as the events surrounding the Benghazi attacks. The ARB suggests collaborating joint courses that integrate high-threat training and risk management decision processes through the Diplomatic Security Training Center and Foreign Service Institute, along with Foreign Affairs Counter Threat training, to improve their leadership abilities in such instances.¹²¹ Leaders should be prepared to handle any type of situation that is presented to them. This includes situations that involve high risk and high threats. Any activity surrounding the U.S. Mission should have been considered high risk and a high threat considering the ill intent of the extremist militias in Libya. Senior policy and intelligence leaders should have recognized this and taken the proper precautionary measures to ensure the safety of all U.S. personnel.

In this particular case study, a form of leadership previously addressed that would be ideal for this event would be the situational approach. Since the environment in Benghazi was at high risk and unpredictable, leaders should have adapted to this environment and led their subordinates toward safety at all times. Intelligence and policy leaders failed in this regard by not fulfilling the repeated requests for security made by U.S. personnel in Benghazi. They ignored proper security measures and lives were put at risk because of their laziness and inability to prioritize these lives of their fellow Americans, as also mentioned in ARB report. The ARB states, “Board members found a pervasive realization among personnel who served in Benghazi that the Special Mission was not a high priority for

¹²¹ Ibid., pg. 11, <http://www.state.gov/documents/organization/202446.pdf>

Washington when it came to security-related requests, especially those relating to staffing.”¹²²

Lack of education, training, and experience led to four dead Americans. Had the proper leaders taken the initiative to educate themselves about the enemy and the high-threat circumstances, and then sought the proper training to learn how to handle these threats, they would almost certainly have prevented these killings. Those who had been more experienced would have recognized the need for further education and training in order to be successful in handling these matters. The ARB reports that the staff assigned to the Special Mission in Benghazi were relatively inexperienced and consisted of personnel who worked temporary duty assignments, which ultimately resulted in “diminished institutional knowledge, continuity, and mission capacity.”¹²³ Although intelligence failures are inevitable over the long term, those that occurred before the Benghazi attacks can definitely be avoided and prevented with proper leadership. Leaders who fully commit themselves to a task strive to be competent. They ensure they are properly educated and trained so they can achieve success and avoid failure.

Pearl Harbor

The attack on Pearl Harbor is a moment that united Americans across the nation as we made our entrance into World War II. Many Americans remember the raid as a “surprise” attack by the Japanese. Some believe conspiracy theories that claim President Franklin D. Roosevelt had prior knowledge of the attack and needed a significant reason to gain America’s support for entering World War II (which lack credible evidence), while

¹²² Ibid., pg. 5

¹²³ Ibid., pg. 4

others who have done the research, “view Pearl Harbor as the consequence of missed clues, intelligence errors, and overconfidence.”¹²⁴

On December 7, 1941, more than 2,400 American soldiers and sailors were killed and at least another 1,000 were wounded after hundreds of Japanese fighter planes attacked Pearl Harbor that morning. Nearly 20 American naval vessels, to include eight battleships, and over 200 airplanes were destroyed.¹²⁵ Fortunately, all of the aircraft carriers were away from the base and none was destroyed. On December 8, 1941, Congress approved President Roosevelt’s declaration of war and the United States was now a part of World War II.

Although most Americans remember the attack at Pearl Harbor as a “surprise” attack, the reality is that signs of the attack were presented to the IC and policymakers, but ultimately ignored for various reasons. Prior to the attack, the relationship between the U.S. and Japan had deteriorated. Policymakers were aware of the hostility between the U.S. and Japan, but underestimated Japan’s intentions and capabilities. Although they were keeping a close eye on Japan, there were several warnings that were overlooked that would have allowed our government leaders to take preventative action against the Pearl Harbor attack.

One of the most useful and promising intelligence collection methods that have been used, especially prior to the attacks of Pearl Harbor, is code breaking. The U.S. Army and Navy were each assigned special sections of decoding Japanese communications. This

¹²⁴ “FDR and Pearl Harbor,” *Franklin D. Roosevelt Presidential Library and Museum*, accessed February 28, 2015, retrieved from <http://www.fdrlibrary.marist.edu/archives/pdfs/pearlharbor.pdf>

¹²⁵ “Pearl Harbor,” *History Channel*, accessed February 28, 2015, retrieved from <http://www.history.com/topics/world-war-ii/pearl-harbor>

operation that decoded Japanese codes and ciphers was known as MAGIC.¹²⁶ Military and government officials had access to some of the “most private communications between the Japanese government and its ambassadors in Washington, Berlin, Rome, Berne, Ankara, and other Japanese embassies throughout the world.”¹²⁷ They had the advantage of knowing, in advance, the diplomatic moves of Japan and what information Japan had on American defense preparedness.

The U.S. Army and Navy cracked a variety of codes to include the top-priority code, PURPLE. PURPLE was decoded by first finding the key, which depended on getting a certain amount of traffic in that key, and then decoded by a machine.¹²⁸ There were four machines built with a fifth in production for Pearl Harbor. These machines obtained information from Tokyo faster than the Japanese themselves.¹²⁹ By late 1941, cryptanalysts were deciphering 50 to 75 messages a day.¹³⁰ Although MAGIC was only discussed among a few government officials, Americans had a tremendous advantage over Japan, or so they thought. One misconception about MAGIC was that our government and military officials were able to decode all messages, to include Japanese naval and military codes. In actuality, we were only able to decode diplomatic and espionage messages; therefore, we were unable

¹²⁶ Wohlstetter, Roberta, *Pearl Harbor – Warning and Decision*. Stanford, California: Stanford University Press, 1962. Pg. 170

¹²⁷ Ibid.

¹²⁸ Ibid., pg. 173

¹²⁹ Ibid.

¹³⁰ Kahn, David, “The Intelligence Failure of Pearl Harbor,” *Foreign Affairs*, 2004. Pg. 143

to decode any strategic and tactical planning. Simply relying on these decoded messages was a major contribution that led to the “sneak attack.”

Although there were not any strategic messages exchanged between Japanese government officials and their ambassadors around the world, the IC did decode a couple of messages that contained talk of Pearl Harbor prior to the attack. Unfortunately, they were obviously not given high priority, as they should have been. The first message occurred on September 24, 1941. The message between Tokyo and the Japanese Consulate in Honolulu was intercepted that requested the consulate make reports to divide the waters of Pearl Harbor in five subareas.¹³¹ This message was translated by the U.S. Army on October 9, 1941 and delivered by Commander A.D. Kramer. Commander Kramer found the information to be interesting and highlighted its’ importance with: “Tokyo directs special reports on ships in Pearl Harbor which is divided into five areas for the purpose of showing exact locations.”¹³² According to the United States Congress Investigation, after the attack, the message was referred to as the “bomb plot message,” the “harbor berthing plan,” and other similar terms.¹³³

¹³¹ U.S. Congress. Senate. Joint Committee on the Investigation of the Pearl Harbor Attack Congress of the United States. *A Concurrent Resolution to Investigate the Attack on Pearl Harbor on December 7, 1941, and Events and Circumstances Relating thereto and Additional Views of Mr. Keefe together with Minority Views of Mr. Ferguson and Mr. Brewster.* 79th Cong., 2d sess, July 20, 1946. Pg. 182

¹³² Wohlstetter, Roberta, *Pearl Harbor – Warning and Decision.* Stanford, California: Stanford University Press, 1962. Pg. 212

¹³³ U.S. Congress. Senate. Joint Committee on the Investigation of the Pearl Harbor Attack Congress of the United States. *A Concurrent Resolution to Investigate the Attack on Pearl Harbor on December 7, 1941, and Events and Circumstances Relating thereto and Additional Views of Mr. Keefe together with Minority Views of Mr. Ferguson and Mr. Brewster.* 79th Cong., 2d sess, July 20, 1946. Pg. 182

There were three more intercepted messages that related to the September 24 message and made reference to Pearl Harbor prior to the attack. On November 15, 1941, another message between Tokyo and the Honolulu Consulate was translated on December 3 stated “As relations between Japan and the United States are most critical, make your ‘ships in harbor report’ irregular, but at a rate of twice a week. Although you already are no doubt aware, please take extra care to maintain secrecy.”¹³⁴ On November 20, a message intercepted that read, “Please investigate comprehensively the fleet – bases in the neighborhood of the Hawaiian military reservation.” This message was translated on December 4, a day after the previous message. The final message, intercepted on November 29 and translated December 5 (the third consecutive day to identify messages relating to Pearl Harbor), a message read, “We have been receiving reports from you on ship movements, but in future will you also report even when there is no movements?”¹³⁵ After three consecutive days of translating messages that addressed the American Fleet at Pearl Harbor, why did our IC fail to detect a pattern in those messages? Would our IC not be sensitive to any information involving the United States, especially after consecutive warning? Although there was not any specific indication of an attack, or more specifically, the exact timing of an attack, is that a sufficient reason to not take precautionary measures if there is some indication your homeland may be a target? As General Walter Short stated after the attack in his testimony, “...they should certainly have let me know that the Japanese

¹³⁴ Ibid.

¹³⁵ Ibid.

were getting reports of the exact location of the ships in Pearl Harbor...because such details would be useful only for sabotage, or for air submarine attack in Hawaii.”¹³⁶

A major error that our intelligence and government leaders ultimately made was underestimating the enemy and becoming overconfident with the intelligence collected. Failure to recognize the possibility of an attack upon our own soil even though intelligence pointed directly to the attack is a reflection of poor leadership. Intelligence and government officials were convinced Japan would be senseless by attacking the United States. There was no doubt that the United States was more powerful strategically and as an army. Japan strategically used this to their advantage and had a successful attack. The United States ignored the unimaginable and, what they thought, was the impossible.

The incredible efforts in decoding the Japanese diplomatic communications with their ambassadors around the world through MAGIC gave our nation a significant advantage over Japan, but also led to overconfidence in their judgment. Although MAGIC only intercepted diplomatic communications, our intelligence analysts relied heavily on these daily interceptions and believed MAGIC would catch every vital piece of information. This heavy reliance led to underestimating the capabilities of the Japanese and their intentions.¹³⁷

As discussed earlier, one of the major causes of an intelligence failure is when biases and opinions have an impact on decision making during any level of the intelligence process. It is common for an individual to form their belief on a particular matter and have that belief influence future decisions concerning the same matter. New information that is inconsistent

¹³⁶ Ibid., pg. 183

¹³⁷ Wohlstetter, Roberta, *Pearl Harbor – Warning and Decision*. Stanford, California: Stanford University Press, 1962. Pg. 300

with one's beliefs is easily discarded, while information in agreement with one's beliefs is taken into consideration during the analytical process.¹³⁸ As Roberta Wohlstetter states, "There is tendency in our planning to confuse the unfamiliar with the improbable. The contingency we have not considered seriously looks strange; what looks strange is thought improbable; what is improbable need not be considered seriously."¹³⁹ Intelligence officers had convinced themselves that if Japan were going to attack anyone, they were going to attack Southeast Asia. Therefore, since they strongly believed their perception to be the truth, any other intelligence not focused or directed toward an attack on Southeast Asia was mentally discarded.¹⁴⁰ The leaders involved in this matter were convinced they had all the information they needed due to the success of MAGIC. They felt in control of our relations with Japan and underestimated Japan's capabilities. Information that addressed Pearl Harbor as a potential target for an attack was not viewed as a threat and was not even considered for further investigation.¹⁴¹ Commander Kramer testified that he does "not believe it was interpreted by any of those persons as being materially different than other messages concerning ship movements being reported by the Japanese diplomatic service."¹⁴² Although

¹³⁸ Gookins Amanda J. "The Role of Intelligence in Policy Making." *SAIS Review of International Affairs* 28, no. 1 (2008): pg. 69. <https://muse.jhu.edu/>

¹³⁹ Wohlstetter, Roberta, *Pearl Harbor – Warning and Decision*. Stanford, California: Stanford University Press, 1962. Pg. vii

¹⁴⁰ U.S. Congress. Senate. Joint Committee on the Investigation of the Pearl Harbor Attack Congress of the United States. *A Concurrent Resolution to Investigate the Attack on Pearl Harbor on December 7, 1941, and Events and Circumstances Relating thereto and Additional Views of Mr. Keefe together with Minority Views of Mr. Ferguson and Mr. Brewster*. 79th Cong., 2d sess, July 20, 1946. Pg. 262

¹⁴¹ *Ibid.*, Pg. 252

he marked the message as an “interesting message,” his translation of the September 24th message was that it was similar to other messages intercepted through MAGIC and did not impose a threat to him or anyone else who read the message. The ability to make effective and efficient decisions can be impaired once one becomes narrow minded and ignores new evidence or ideas. Successful leaders keep an open mind to new ideas and perspectives and take all accounts of an event into consideration.

After such a “surprise” attack as Pearl Harbor, there were obvious mistakes made that needed attention and evaluation in order to prevent a repeat in history. The United States Congress conducted an investigation surrounding the facts of the attack in order to determine where the origin of the problem was and what can be done to help resolve the problem. There were several areas in the intelligence process that required special attention. The first recommendation made was a recommendation that is still made today in order to improve our IC and the intelligence process – agency integration. The investigation recommends “That there be a complete integration of Army and Navy intelligence agencies in order to avoid the pitfalls of divided responsibility which experience has made so abundantly apparent...”¹⁴³ The chances of an intelligence failure increase when agencies within the IC either refuse to share intelligence with one another, or are not educated on how and when to share intelligence. Intelligence leaders must have the ability to recognize when and what intelligence should be shared among agencies. This ability is developed through valuable experience and proper education and training. They understand the importance of intelligence sharing and direct their priorities toward the best interests of this country.

¹⁴² Ibid., pg. 183

¹⁴³ Ibid., pg. 253

As previously addressed, efficient and effective leaders are those who are able to put aside their own personal beliefs, among other things, and have the ability to consider all avenues of any given situation. By doing so, they are able to have “greater imagination and a keener awareness of the significance of intelligence” that is collected.¹⁴⁴ These abilities are usually developed through proper education, training, and experience. Those who seek education on certain matters to expand their knowledge on the variety of possibilities and who seek specific training on how to handle the potential threats that may be involved are adequate leaders. By expanding their knowledge on different matters, the leader is exposed to an array of information. Without proper exposure, leaders have no choice but to rely on what they already know. Leaders then become too comfortable with their own beliefs and fail to exercise their best decision-making skills

Receiving the proper education on certain matters and learning how to handle them is equally important as familiarizing themselves of their own organization and subordinates. By doing so, leaders are able to adopt the most fitting leadership style and training techniques that can ultimately achieve success. It is difficult to delegate effectively if a leader is not familiar with his or her people. Good, competent leaders are those who are able to relate to their subordinates and, most importantly, relay the importance of proper execution within the intelligence process. As the United States Congress Investigation states, “An official who neglects to familiarize himself in detail with his organization should forfeit his responsibility.”¹⁴⁵

¹⁴⁴ Ibid., pg. 250

¹⁴⁵ Ibid., pg. 263

Discarded intelligence cost several Americans their lives and crippled our retaliatory powers for nearly six months. Leaders became overconfident with their findings and were humbled when Japan caught our nation off guard and destroyed the U.S. Pacific Fleet at Pearl Harbor. Although intelligence leaders were successful in breaking the Japanese code through MAGIC and were able to intercept communications between Japan and their ambassadors around the world, they failed at properly analyzing the intelligence produced by creating a tunnel vision of “acceptable” intelligence. Intelligence leaders could have escaped this tunnel vision had they received the appropriate education and training of our relation issues with Japan. We may not have been involved in World War II while we were collecting intelligence regarding Japan prior to the attack, but considering the aggression circumstances around the world, our leaders should have been more aware and considerate of potential threats involving our country.

Cuban Missile Crisis

Failures are usually more noticeable than achievements since failures require more attention and reform. However, there are multiple instances where intelligence has led a mission to success though - one of the most being the Cuban Missile Crisis. Many Americans remember the Cuban Missile Crisis as an event that exemplified superb leadership within the IC and among policymakers. Both entities worked together to diffuse the nuclear threat imposed by the Soviet Union in order to avoid a nuclear war that would affect those involved directly and indirectly. These leaders took the time to educate themselves about the situation and the tactical abilities of the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics (USSR) in the area. They applied knowledge and expertise accumulated through training and experience toward the situation and worked diligently to ensure success.

After an embarrassing intelligence failure in attempting to overthrow the Castro regime in Cuba with the Bay of Pigs invasion, U.S. intelligence continued their interest in Cuba and discovered evidence that included a major Soviet arms build-up, including IL-28 bombers, during routine surveillance flights.¹⁴⁶ As a warning to Cuba, President Kenney issued a public statement advising Cuba against introducing offensive weapons while emphasizing U.S. military and nuclear superiority over the Soviet Union.¹⁴⁷ Due to the failed Bay of Pigs invasion, Soviet leader Nikita Khrushchev was convinced he could covertly place offensive missiles in Cuba. After the missiles were in position in Cuba, Khrushchev decided that President Kennedy would not escalate the situation by insisting they be removed. Khrushchev continued to assume President Kennedy's lack of leadership and confidence and ignored any and all warnings against the USSR.¹⁴⁸

The IC and policymakers at this time had doubt about the utility of HUMINT and thus favored technical sources of intelligence such as vehicles, ships, aircraft, and satellites. Although they were favorable of these types of intelligence, they were reluctant to allow U-2 flights over Cuban territory in fear of Soviet missiles shooting down the flights right before mid-term elections. Fortunately, DCI John McCone challenged their reluctance and obtained President Kennedy's approval to allow the U-2 flights over the interior of Cuba.¹⁴⁹ Without

¹⁴⁶ "The Cuban Missile Crisis, October 1962," *U.S. Department of State – Office of the Historian*, accessed March 4, 2015, retrieved from <https://history.state.gov/milestones/1961-1968/cuban-missile-crisis>

¹⁴⁷ *Ibid.* <https://history.state.gov/milestones/1961-1968/cuban-missile-crisis>

¹⁴⁸ Absher, Kenneth Michael. "Mind-Sets and Missiles: A First Hand Account of the Cuban Missile Crisis," *Strategic Studies Institute*, September 2009. Pg. 1-2

¹⁴⁹ *Ibid.*, pg. 3

DCI McCone's persistence, the nuclear missiles would have gone undiscovered and would have posed a huge threat to our national security.

DCI McCone was asked to assume his position in 1961 by President Kennedy himself. Ironically, McCone did not have prior intelligence experience, but made an impression on President Kennedy with his profound leadership in the engineering and construction fields. McCone graduated from the University of California, Berkeley with a degree in engineering. He founded one of the leading U.S. shipbuilding companies during World War II after he graduated and earned the notice of government leaders with his leadership and production standards.¹⁵⁰ President Harry S. Truman recruited McCone and appointed him to the Air Policy Commission in 1947 and further named him special deputy to the Secretary of Defense the following year. Shortly after, McCone became the undersecretary of the Air Force in 1950, and then served as chairman to the Atomic Energy Commission under President Dwight Eisenhower until he assumed the position of DCI in 1961.¹⁵¹ McCone's technological expertise helped influence President Kennedy to approve the U-2 flights over Cuba. The decision to allow the U-2 flights would lead directly to the biggest challenge of Kennedy's presidency. Not only did the approved U-2 flights discover Russian nuclear missiles in Cuba, but they also (indirectly) led to the death of United States Air Force (USAF) Major Rudolph Anderson, Jr. on October 27th, 1962, when his plane was shot down by an SA-2 surface- to air missile.

¹⁵⁰ "A Look Back...John Alex McCone Becomes DCI," *Central Intelligence Agency*, last modified April 30, 2013, <https://www.cia.gov/news-information/featured-story-archive/2008-featured-story-archive/john-alex-mccone-becomes-dci.html>

¹⁵¹ Ibid. <https://www.cia.gov/news-information/featured-story-archive/2008-featured-story-archive/john-alex-mccone-becomes-dci.html>

It was McCone's persistence that allowed the IC to identify the nuclear missiles the Soviets were attempting to hide in Cuba. Although Soviet leaders advised Khrushchev against the idea, he decided to follow through and begin the importation of offensive missiles into Cuba.¹⁵² Khrushchev began importing Soviet military equipment and personnel by trying to claim they were importing agricultural supplies to Cuba. Of course, that cover-up was hard to believe, but no one believed the Soviets would be importing military equipment until the IC detected SA-2 SAM (Soviet surface-to-air missiles) sites in early August 1962. This detection raised a flag with DCI McCone and immediately after the detection, he gave several warnings to President Kennedy that he believed the Soviets were intending to place offensive missiles in Cuba.¹⁵³ McCone attended meetings in August 1962 with several of President Kennedy's advisors and voiced his thoughts regarding Soviet intentions. McCone used deductive reasoning to come to his conclusion, but was still unable to convince the Kennedy Administration (the same individuals who were fearful of flying U-2 flights over Cuba) of the potential offensive missiles in Cuba.

McCone continued to press his strong opinions about the Soviet's intentions in Cuba for the next couple of months. While McCone was on his honeymoon in France after getting married in September, he learned that there had not been U-2 flights ordered to fly over Cuba during the time he was out of the country. There was very little information that had been obtained about Cuba's interior.¹⁵⁴ Since no one had ordered U-2 flights to monitor the

¹⁵² Absher, Kenneth Michael. "Mind-Sets and Missiles: A First Hand Account of the Cuban Missile Crisis," *Strategic Studies Institute*, September 2009. Pg. 22

¹⁵³ *Ibid.*, pg. 29

¹⁵⁴ *Ibid.*, pg. 41

activity in Cuba for over a month, McCone was unable to make a definitive statement that there were not any offensive missiles in Cuba. A lack of intelligence does not equate to intelligence itself, but rather indicates lack of information. Although the September Special National Intelligence Estimate (SNIE) underestimated the Soviet's capabilities of producing and storing offensive missiles in Cuba, McCone decided to address the President with his concerns and propositions.¹⁵⁵ President Kennedy's advisors remained adamantly against over-flights and insisted on flying peripheral missions. McCone countered their proposals by showing that peripheral missions could not confirm nor deny the presence of offensive missiles. He proposed sending a number of short flights over Cuba that would scan the entire island. The COMOR (Committee on Overhead Reconnaissance) and President Kennedy approved his proposal and ordered four (4) U-2 flights to fly over Cuba on October 14th. This mission, insisted upon by DCI McCone, was the first to discover the installation of Soviet offensive missiles.¹⁵⁶

On October 14, 1962, Pilot Major Richard Heyser crossed into Cuba territory in an American U-2 spy plane and took 928 pictures, in six minutes, of nuclear missiles located in Cuba.¹⁵⁷ After submitting the photos to the Naval Photographic Interpretation Center at Suitland, Maryland, it was discovered the Soviet Union was behind the construction of

¹⁵⁵ Allison, Graham T., *Essence of Decision*. Boston: Little, Brown and Company, 1971. Pg. 119

¹⁵⁶ Absher, Kenneth Michael. "Mind-Sets and Missiles: A First Hand Account of the Cuban Missile Crisis," *Strategic Studies Institute*, September 2009. Pg. 45-46

¹⁵⁷ "The Cuban Missile Crisis of 1962: Presenting the Photographic Evidence Abroad." Central Intelligence Agency. July 7, 2008. <https://www.cia.gov/library/center-for-the-study-of-intelligence/csi-publications/books-and-monographs/sherman-kent-and-the-board-of-national-estimates-collected-essays/10cuban.html>

surface-to-surface nuclear missiles. On the morning of October 16, 1962, President Kennedy and his principal advisors were informed of the evidence, confirming DCI McCone's judgment, and began to deliberate over the matter and consider what actions needed to be taken. The deliberation lasted for five days while President Kennedy and his advisors considered possible outcomes to an array of decisions.

They all knew that a decision had to be made quickly to stop the construction of nuclear missiles; it was just a matter of deciding which action would have a lesser consequence. The President and his advisors were aware that any action chosen could possibly lead to a bigger crisis. As stated in the CIA Library, "Even if events stopped a long way short of the cataclysm, there was still room for a thundering crisis, the outcome of which would depend in significant measure upon the way in which our allies would respond—whether they would support us or back away."¹⁵⁸ The President needed to terminate and remove the Soviet Union's construction all while attempting to avoid a nuclear war.

The President and his advisors contemplated their decisions in secret meetings up until they were ready to brief the public on the matter. Eight (8) days after Major Heyser snapped photos of the nuclear missiles being constructed by the Soviet Union in Cuba, President Kennedy made the decision to address American citizens and inform them of the situation along with the possible outcomes that may result after action has been taken. The decision was made to quarantine Cuban imports of all offensive military equipment. This was just the first step in taking action to remove the missiles from Cuba. President Kennedy presented the operation to the public with careful consideration by using the word

¹⁵⁸ Ibid., <https://www.cia.gov/library/center-for-the-study-of-intelligence/csi-publications/books-and-monographs/sherman-kent-and-the-board-of-national-estimates-collected-essays/10cuban.html>

“quarantine” specifically to avoid any verbiage that could or would trigger a war with the Soviet Union. The President was aware that using the term “blockade” might lead to a war, since placing a blockade can be construed an act of war. His decision to force the removal of the missiles would upset the Soviet Union, but his plan of action was to successfully remove the missiles without starting a war.¹⁵⁹

President Kennedy’s decision to quarantine all offensive military equipment effectively resulted in a ring of ships around Cuba. Specifically, the purpose of the quarantine was to prevent the Soviets from importing additional military supplies. Although President Kennedy and his advisors knew the Soviet Union would be upset with the quarantine, no one was able to predict how Khrushchev would react. The objective of the operation was to communicate a political message from President Kennedy to Khrushchev.¹⁶⁰ President Kennedy took great caution in his decisions in order to avoid upsetting Khrushchev. He was careful not to provoke Khrushchev into war, but was fully prepared to invade Cuba.

On October 28, 1962, Khrushchev publicly agreed to remove the nuclear missiles in return for a U.S. pledge not to invade Cuba.¹⁶¹ According to the JFK Library, “...the leaders of both superpowers recognized the devastating possibility of a nuclear war and publicly agreed to a deal in which the Soviets would dismantle the weapon sites in exchange for a

¹⁵⁹ Sherwin, Martin J. “*One Step from Nuclear War – The Cuban Missile Crisis at 50: In Search of Historical Perspective.*” National Archives. Vol. 44, No. 2. Fall 2012. <http://www.archives.gov/publications/prologue/2012/fall/cuban-missiles.html>

¹⁶⁰ Allison, Graham T., *Essence of Decision*. Boston: Little, Brown and Company, 1971. Pg. 131

¹⁶¹ Absher, Kenneth Michael. “Mind-Sets and Missiles: A First Hand Account of the Cuban Missile Crisis,” *Strategic Studies Institute*, September 2009. Pg. 75

pledge from the United States not to invade Cuba.”¹⁶² President Kennedy was able successfully to address the issue presented through intelligence all while avoiding what could have been a disastrous war.

Policymakers were insistent upon making the “safe” decision instead of taking the required risks to collect appropriate intelligence. Without McCone’s persistence, failure to take the necessary measures to confirm or deny offensive missiles in Cuba could have led to a much bigger national security issue than the repercussions of a downed U-2 flight. Good, competent leaders consider all consequences to all decisions and prioritize these consequences. They do not allow predetermined mindsets to control evidence of an adversary’s probable or ongoing actions. Policymakers were reluctant to confirm or deny whether the Soviets stored offensive missiles in Cuba. They were opposed to taking the risk, even though our national security would be at a higher risk if nuclear weapons were detected. Instead, they were fearful of U-2 flights being shot down. Comparatively, running the risk posed by U-2 flights being shot down was far less than risking the possibility of offensive missiles in Cuba. Leaders must decide “how much risk is worth taking to gain the information needed to make wise policy in dangerous situations.”¹⁶³ DCI McCone recognized the potential dangers in ignoring potential offensive missiles in Cuba and took the initiative to prove the existence or non-existence of such missiles.

McCone, aware of his responsibilities as an intelligence leader, initially remained open-minded to any and all possibilities relating to the Soviets and Cuba. He stated that the

¹⁶² “*Cuban Missile Crisis.*” John F. Kennedy Presidential Library & Museum. <http://www.jfklibrary.org/JFK/JFK-in-History/Cuban-Missile-Crisis.aspx>

¹⁶³ Absher, Kenneth Michael. “Mind-Sets and Missiles: A First Hand Account of the Cuban Missile Crisis,” *Strategic Studies Institute*, September 2009. Pg. 86

position he took was based on a judgment factor. Intelligence analysts deal with facts in the analytical process whereas intelligence leaders deal with intuition and judgment.¹⁶⁴

McCone's experience in the business field allowed him to make a reasonable judgment regarding the situation and use inferences and deductive reasoning to support his judgment. He alone among President Kennedy's staff believed that the Soviets were importing nuclear missiles into Cuba. If he had any amount of doubt in his position and abilities as a leader, he would not have persisted in his stance. McCone educated himself on what the Soviets were capable of and understood that they were the enemy, not a friend, and that the bigger risk would be to make decisions based on their statements, rather than their actions.¹⁶⁵

The leadership exhibited during this crisis was profound and exemplary. Both President Kennedy and DCI McCone utilized their knowledge of Russia and intuition regarding its true intentions to make sound decisions toward our national security. Kennedy admired McCone's persistence and his role as DCI. The admiration was mutual as McCone commended President Kennedy's handling of the crisis.¹⁶⁶ They were both determined to identify the problem and make rational decisions to protect our nation and avoid a nuclear war. McCone was determined to find out what the Soviets were up to in Cuba and once the missiles were detected, Kennedy was determined that they would not be a threat to the U.S. Kennedy used strategic methods to ensure he did not provoke a war with the Soviets. He was careful to devise a quarantine rather than a blockade because the latter would have been an

¹⁶⁴ McCone, John. *Reflections on a Life in Government Service*. By Harry Kreisler. Conversations with History; Institute of International Studies, UC Berkeley, Fall 1987 and Spring 1988. <http://globetrotter.berkeley.edu/conversations/McCone/mccone-con4.html>

¹⁶⁵ Ibid. <http://globetrotter.berkeley.edu/conversations/McCone/mccone-con4.html>

¹⁶⁶ Ibid. <http://globetrotter.berkeley.edu/conversations/McCone/mccone-con4.html>

act of war.¹⁶⁷ As McCone stated, “It was an indication of his cautious but determined approach.”¹⁶⁸ Both leaders used the situational approach and adapted their leadership skills to the crisis. This style of leadership was used due to the complexity and diversity of issues that arose. They were each cautious with their decisions toward the crisis to ensure bigger issues were avoided that could have a greater impact on our national security. Both leaders executed this style of leadership efficiently and effectively and successfully avoided what could have been a nuclear war.

¹⁶⁷ Ibid. <http://globetrotter.berkeley.edu/conversations/McCone/mccone-con4.html>

¹⁶⁸ Ibid. <http://globetrotter.berkeley.edu/conversations/McCone/mccone-con4.html>

CHAPTER IV

CONCLUSION

As shown in this study, continuous education, training, and experience can greatly affect the outcome of a mission and/or situation. These components combined with the qualities and traits of a leader minimize the chance for failure while ensuring our national security needs are met. It is vital that intelligence leaders establish a strong leadership foundation by focusing constantly on these key elements - education, training and experience. They are able to further the development of their skills through different sources of education and training. Leaders who do not pursue any of these key elements are more likely to produce intelligence failures that can potentially compromise our national security.

The case studies addressed in the previous chapter illustrate how the lack of education, training, and experience can lead to an intelligence failure and result in bigger consequences, such as taking the lives of innocent individuals. One common mistake made by intelligence leaders that has led to failure, as seen in the 2012 Benghazi attack and Pearl Harbor case studies, is a lack of education regarding the enemy and its capabilities. Leaders fail to take the time and effort to educate themselves about the enemy, which is a vital part to countering their threats and offensive actions. The Pearl Harbor attack is a primary example of this failure. In this case, the warnings of the attack were evident, but were ignored by the IC because they dismissed the idea of Japan being capable of attacking the U.S. This underestimation cost the lives of thousands of innocent individuals and had a detrimental impact on our nation. By having a better understanding of our enemies' capabilities, leaders

are able to direct their training toward specific subject matters or areas of improvement to meet the needs of the mission at task.

Chapter II of this study identifies several sources of training and education that are available to intelligence leaders. There are academic institutions available to these leaders along with trainings offered by Federal government agencies such as OPM, OGE, and DoD. There are also several training opportunities that are available that meet the specific needs of a mission and/or to counter a threat imposed upon our nation. In order to become a better leader, he or she must take the initiative to seek the proper education and training to help maximize his or her abilities and skills. As mentioned in Chapter 2, the education and training received will not substitute the quality of valuable professional experience. Experience develops qualities in a leader that cannot be developed through a training program or academic class. DCI McCone's position in the Cuban Missile Crisis, as discussed in Chapter III, is an excellent example of the value of experience. Although he did not have prior intelligence experience, he developed critical qualities as a leader, such as character and intuition, through his experience as a business professional in the engineering field. His profound display of these qualities earned him leadership positions within different presidential administrations. His character allowed him to remain unbiased and eliminate any pre-determined mindsets surrounding him during the crisis. His intuition was a major factor in his deductive reasoning toward the judgment he made regarding the offensive missiles in Cuba. Without his persistency and strong leadership skills, the nuclear missiles could have gone unnoticed and had a detrimental impact upon our nation.

These and other vital qualities of a leader are addressed in Chapter I. This chapter sets forth the foundational attributes of an intelligence leader and the duties with which he or

she is entrusted. It also describes the intelligence process and the relationship between policymakers and the IC. This relationship is displayed in all three case studies discussed in the previous chapter. Weak policy-intelligence relationships increase the chances of failure whereas a strong relationship has potential to lead to a successful outcome. By comparing the case studies presented in this study, it is evident that the relationship between DCI McCone and President Kennedy is one of the critical things that led to a successful resolution of the Cuban Missile Crisis. The uncertainty between the IC and policymakers displayed in the 2012 Benghazi Attacks study contributed to the intelligence failure. The IC appeared to understand the capabilities of the Islamic extremist groups, but it failed to communicate this understanding to policymakers. By simply opening a line of communication between the IC and policymakers, this failure could have been prevented. Lack of knowledge in a variety of policy and intelligence arenas can lead to uncertainty. This can either be a result of ignorance or just a lack of communication. A unified effort between the IC and policymakers will not only increase our chances of success, but also relieve additional stresses that accompany discord.

One major part of a leader's position that can help achieve his or her success is the style of leadership that is practiced. There are leaders who make their decisions based on the situation presented to them, while there are leaders who are evaluated and judged for quality through their actions. There are also leaders who focus on transforming other into leaders themselves. Some leaders achieve more success by delegating and earning respect from their subordinates. Other leaders prefer to work with their subordinates to establish a strong, working relationship in order to become successful. It is not the style of leadership that defines a leader; rather it is how that style is executed. The different styles of leadership

discussed in Chapter I can be more effective with a solid foundation of the key elements addressed in this study.

These key elements are necessary to developing good, competent leaders in our IC. Leaders who further their education, training, and experience have a better chance of achieving success. While it is recommended that leaders should take the initiative to seek these elements and strive to be better leaders, it would be beneficial for agencies to mandate certain training programs and classes either as a basic foundation or on a case-by-case basis (depending on the circumstances surrounding our national security at the time). It is difficult to think of any negative consequences to imposing these key elements considering they are used as development tools. They will only work to improve our intelligence leaders, which ultimately improves our efforts to maintain our national security.

BIBLIOGRAPHY

- Absher, Kenneth Michael. "Mind-Sets and Missiles: A First Hand Account of the Cuban Missile Crisis," *Strategic Studies Institute*, September 2009.
- AFCEA Education Foundation, "The Intelligence Community: An Overview," accessed October 8, 2014 http://www.afcea.org/education/details.cfm?course_number=203-14-FXVA-1
- Allison, Graham T., *Essence of Decision*. Boston: Little, Brown and Company, 1971.
- Center for Leadership Development, "About Us," accessed October 8, 2014 <http://cldcentral.usalearning.net/mod/page/view.php?id=234>
- Center for Leadership Development, "Custom Leadership Development and Training Solutions," accessed October 8, 2014 <http://cldcentral.usalearning.net/mod/page/view.php?id=257>
- Central Intelligence Agency, "A Look Back...John Alex McCone Becomes DCI," last modified April 30, 2013, <https://www.cia.gov/news-information/featured-story-archive/2008-featured-story-archive/john-alex-mccone-becomes-dci.html>
- Central Intelligence Agency, "CIA Documents on the Cuban Missile Crisis 1962," October 1992. <https://www.cia.gov/library/center-for-the-study-of-intelligence/csi-publications/books-and-monographs/Cuban%20Missile%20Crisis1962.pdf>
- Central Intelligence Agency, "Pearl Harbor: Estimating Then and Now," last modified August 5, 2011, https://www.cia.gov/library/center-for-the-study-of-intelligence/kent-csi/vol9no4/html/v09i4a07p_0001.htm

Central Intelligence Agency, “The Cuban Missile Crisis of 1962: Presenting the Photographic Evidence Abroad.” July 7, 2008. <https://www.cia.gov/library/center-for-the-study-of-intelligence/csi-publications/books-and-monographs/sherman-kent-and-the-board-of-national-estimates-collected-essays/10cuban.html>

Clapper, James R., “Classification Management and Control Markings System,” *Office of the Director of National Intelligence – Intelligence Community Directive 710*, June 21, 2013. Pg. 1-9

Cook, Martin. “Moral Reasoning as a Strategic Leader Competency”. US Army War College.

Defense Intelligence Agency, “Joint Military Intelligence Training Center (JMITC),” accessed October 8, 2014
[http://www.dia.mil/Training/JointMilitaryIntelligenceTrainingCenter\(JMITC.aspx](http://www.dia.mil/Training/JointMilitaryIntelligenceTrainingCenter(JMITC.aspx)

Defense Intelligence Agency, “Our Mission, Role & History,” *U.S. Office of Personnel Management*, accessed October 8, 2014 <http://www.opm.gov/about-us/our-mission-role-history/what-we-do/>

Department of Defense – Defense Security Service, “About CDSE,” accessed October 8, 2014 <http://www.cdse.edu/about.html>

Department of Defense. *Defense Security Enterprise Strategic Plan*. Pg. 3. retrieved from <http://fas.org/sgp/othergov/dod/dse-plan.pdf>

Discoverthenetworks.org – A Guide to the Political Left, “Benghazi: The Terrorist Attack of September 11, 2012 – Executive Summary,” accessed January 24, 2015, retrieved from <http://www.discoverthenetworks.org/viewSubCategory.asp?id=1755>

Fingar, Thomas. "Intelligence and Grand Strategy," *Elsevier Limited*, Winter 2012: 118-134. Accessed April 13, 2015, http://fsi.stanford.edu/sites/default/files/Fingar__Intelligence_and_Grand_Strategy.pdf

Franklin D. Roosevelt Presidential Library and Museum, "FDR and Pearl Harbor," accessed February 28, 2015, retrieved from <http://www.fdrlibrary.marist.edu/archives/pdfs/pearlharbor.pdf>

General Lorenz, Stephen R., "Lorenz on Leadership: Accountability in Public Life." Air Education and Training Command News Story. <http://www.aetc.af.mil/news/story.asp?id=123327873>

Gookins Amanda J. "The Role of Intelligence in Policy Making." *SAIS Review of International Affairs* 28, no. 1 (2008): 65-73. <https://muse.jhu.edu/>

History Channel, "Pearl Harbor," accessed February 28, 2015, retrieved from <http://www.history.com/topics/world-war-ii/pearl-harbor>

John F. Kennedy Presidential Library & Museum, "Cuban Missile Crisis," <http://www.jfklibrary.org/JFK/JFK-in-History/Cuban-Missile-Crisis.aspx>

Johnson, Loch K. *Handbook of Intelligence Studies*. New York: Routledge, 2009.

Kahn, David, "The Intelligence Failure of Pearl Harbor," *Foreign Affairs*, 2004. Pg. 138-152

Lowenthal, Mark M., *Intelligence from Secrets to Policy*. Washington, DC: CQ Press, 2009.

Lt. Col. Evans, David. "Vincennes - A Case Study" (presentation, University of New Mexico - Naval Science 304: Navigation and Naval Operations II, Albuquerque, NM) <http://www.unm.edu/~nrotc/ns304/lesson20.htm>

McCone, John. *Reflections on a Life in Government Service*. By Harry Kreisler.

Conversations with History; Institute of International Studies, UC Berkeley, Fall 1987 and Spring 1988. <http://globetrotter.berkeley.edu/conversations/McCone/mccone-con4.html>

National Intelligence University, “About NIU,” accessed October 8, 2014, <http://niu.edu/wp/about-niu/>

National Intelligence University, “About NIU,” accessed October 8, 2014, <http://niu.edu/wp/about-niu/>

National Intelligence University, “Locations,” accessed October 8, 2014 <http://niu.edu/wp/about-niu/locations/>

National Intelligence University, “Making Intelligence Education More Accessible: NIU Open Academic Center in Quantico,” accessed October 8, 2014 <http://niu.edu/wp/making-intelligence-education-more-accessible-niu-opens-academic-center-in-quantico/>

Northouse, Peter G., *Leadership: Theory and Practice*. Thousand Oaks, CA: Sage Publications, 2004.

Office of the Director of National Intelligence – National Counterintelligence and Security Center, “Web Based Training – Course Descriptions,” accessed October 8, 2014 <http://www.ncsc.gov/training/wbt.php>

Office of the Director of National Intelligence, “Vision 2015 – A Globally Networked and Integrated Intelligence Enterprise,” (2015): 1-24. http://www.au.af.mil/au/awc/awcgate/dni/vision_2015_july08.pdf

Office of the Director of National Intelligence, “Designated Agency Ethics Official,” accessed October 8, 2014 <http://www.dni.gov/index.php/about/leadership/designated-agency-ethics-officer>

Office of the Director of National Intelligence, “Principles of Professional Ethics for the Intelligence Community,” accessed October 8, 2014 <http://www.dni.gov/index.php/intelligence-community/principles-of-professional-ethics>

Office of the Director of National Intelligence, “Statement by the Director of Public Affairs for ODNI, Shawn Turner, on the Intelligence Related to the Terrorist Attack on the U.S. Consulate in Benghazi, Libya,” (Washington, DC, September 28, 2012), <http://www.dni.gov/index.php/newsroom/press-releases/96-press-releases-2012/731-statement-by-the-odni-s-director-of-public-affairs-on-intelligence-related-to-the-terrorist-attack-on-the-u-s-consulate-in-benghazi>

Pillar, Paul R., *Intelligence and U.S. Foreign Policy: Iraq, 9/11, and Misguided Reform* (New York: Columbia University Press, 2011)

Pincus, Walter, “Ex-CIA Official Faults Use of Data on Iraq,” *The Washington Post*, February 10, 2006, <http://www.washingtonpost.com/wp-dyn/content/article/2006/02/09/AR2006020902418.html>

Rabun, Patrick C. “Some Tactical Mistakes Have Theater-Strategic Consequences” Naval War College. Newport, R.I. 6 November 2007. Pg. 5-6

Rogers, Mike, and Ruppertsberger, C.A., *Investigative Report on the Terrorist Attacks on U.S. Facilities in Benghazi, Libya, September 11-12, 2012*, (U.S. House of Representatives 113th Congress, November 21, 2014), 1-36.

<https://intelligence.house.gov/sites/intelligence.house.gov/files/documents/Benghazi%20Report.pdf>

Shelton, Christina, "The Roots of Analytic Failures in the US Intelligence Community," *International Journal of Intelligence and Counterintelligence*, 24:4; 2011, pp. 637-654.

Sherwin, Martin J. "*One Step from Nuclear War – The Cuban Missile Crisis at 50: In Search of Historical Perspective.*" National Archives. Vol. 44, No. 2. Fall 2012.
<http://www.archives.gov/publications/prologue/2012/fall/cuban-missiles.html>

The Institute of World Politics, "About IWP," accessed October 8, 2014
<http://www.iwp.edu/about/>

The Institute of World Politics, "Academic Programs for Defense & Intelligence Leadership," accessed October 8, 2014
<http://www.iwp.edu/programs/detail/academic-programs-for-defense-intelligence-leadership>

The Institute of World Politics, "Mission," accessed October 8, 2014
<http://www.iwp.edu/about/page/mission>

U.S. Congress. Senate. Joint Committee on the Investigation of the Pearl Harbor Attack
Congress of the United States. *A Concurrent Resolution to Investigate the Attack on Pearl Harbor on December 7, 1941, and Events and Circumstances Relating thereto and Additional Views of Mr. Keefe together with Minority Views of Mr. Ferguson and Mr. Brewster.* 79th Cong., 2d sess, July 20, 1946.

U.S. Department of Defense, "Ethics Resources on the Web," accessed October 8, 2014
http://www.dod.mil/dodgc/defense_ethics/resource_library/resourcesindex.html

U.S. Department of State – Office of the Historian, “The Cuban Missile Crisis, October 1962,” accessed March 4, 2015, retrieved from

<https://history.state.gov/milestones/1961-1968/cuban-missile-crisis>

U.S. Office of Personnel Management, “Assessment & Evaluation – Leadership Assessments,” accessed October 8, 2014 <http://www.opm.gov/services-for-agencies/assessment-evaluation/leadership-assessments/#url=New-Leader-Onboarding-Assessment>

U.S. Office of Personnel Management, “Center for Leadership Development,” accessed October 8, 2014 <https://leadership.opm.gov/index.aspx>

U.S. Office of Personnel Management, “Federal Leadership Development Programs,” accessed October 8, 2014 <http://www.opm.gov/services-for-agencies/federal-leadership-development-programs/#url=Search-the-Catalogue>

U.S. Office of Personnel Management, “Senior Executive Service – Executive Core Qualifications,” accessed October 8, 2014 <http://www.opm.gov/policy-data-oversight/senior-executive-service/executive-core-qualifications/>

U.S. Senate Select Committee on Intelligence, *Review of the Terrorist Attacks on U.S. Facilities in Benghazi, Libya, September 11-12, 2012 together with Additional Views*, (U.S. Senate Select Committee on Intelligence 113th Congress, January 15, 2014), pg. 1-85, <http://www.intelligence.senate.gov/benghazi2014/benghazi.pdf>

United States Department of State, “Accountability Review Board (ARB) Report,” accessed February 21, 2015, <http://www.state.gov/documents/organization/202446.pdf>

United States Office of Government Ethics, "Mission, Vision & Goals," *Office of the Director of National Intelligence*, accessed October 8, 2014

<http://www.dni.gov/index.php/about/mission>

Wohlstetter, Roberta, *Pearl Harbor – Warning and Decision*. Stanford, California: Stanford University Press, 1962.

APPENDIX A: ACRONYMS

AFCEA – Armed Forces Communications and Electronics Association
ARB – Accountability Review Board
CDSE – The Center for Development of Security Excellence
CIA – Central Intelligence Agency
COMOR – Committee on Overhead Reconnaissance
DAEO – Designated Agency Ethics Official
DCI – Director Central Intelligence
DIA – Defense Intelligence Agency
DNI – Director of National Intelligence
DoD – Department of Defense
DSE – Defense Security Enterprise
DSS – Defense Security Service
FBI – Federal Bureau of Investigations
FedLDP – Federal Leadership Development Programs
HSC – Homeland Security Council
IC – Intelligence Community
ICD – Intelligence Community Directive
IFF – identification friend or foe
IRTPA – Intelligence Reform and Terrorism Prevention Act
IWP – The Institute of World Politics
JBAB – Joint Base Anacostia-Bolling
JMITC – Joint Military Intelligence Training Center
LIS – Libyan Intelligence Service
NCIX – National Counterintelligence Executive aka Director of National Counterintelligence
NIC – National Intelligence Council
NIU – National Intelligence University
NSC – National Security Council
ODNI – Office of the Director of National Intelligence
OGE – United States Office of Government Ethics
OIG – Office of the Inspector General
OPM – Office of Personnel Management
RSO – Regional Security Officer
SNIE – Special National Intelligence Estimate
TNC – Transitional National Council
TS/SCI – Top Secret/Sensitive Compartmentalized Information
USAF – United States Air Force
USSR – Union of Soviet Socialist Republics
WMD – Weapons of Mass Destruction